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Article 
No Longer a Neutral Magistrate: The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 
the Wake of the War on Terror 
Walter F. Mondale,† Robert A. Stein†† & 
Caitlinrose Fisher††† 
Secrecy, even what would be agreed by reasonable men to be 
necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and barely perceptible accre-
tive process, placed constraints upon the liberties of the Ameri-
can people.—Church Committee, 19761 
 
†  Walter F. Mondale is a 1956 graduate of the University of Minnesota 
Law School, which now holds his name—Mondale Hall. He served on the Min-
nesota Law Review and as a law clerk for the Minnesota Supreme Court. Just 
four years out of law school, Mondale became the youngest Attorney General 
of Minnesota. Later, as a United States Senator, Mondale was an instrumen-
tal member of the Church Committee. He chaired the Domestic Task Force 
and investigated intelligence abuses against Americans by its own agencies. 
The Domestic Task Force uncovered numerous violations of constitutional 
rights, and the proposals of the Church Committee called for permanent Sen-
ate and House committees on intelligence that would have authority over the 
entire intelligence community. In 1976, Mondale was elected Vice President of 
the United States. In the White House, Mondale continued to shape intelli-
gence policy. In particular, in 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) was passed and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was 
created to oversee requests for surveillance warrants against suspected for-
eign intelligence agents inside the United States. Mondale has a recurrent 
long-term interest in the operation of FISA and remains a strong advocate for 
the privacy rights of Americans. 
†† Professor Robert A. Stein rejoined the faculty of the University of 
Minnesota Law School as Everett Fraser Professor of Law in the fall of 2006. 
Previously, from 1994 to 2006, Stein was the Executive Director and Chief Op-
erating Officer of the American Bar Association (ABA), the world’s largest vol-
untary professional membership association, with more than 400,000 mem-
bers. Prior to that, Stein was Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School 
from 1979 to 1994 and was the first William S. Pattee Professor of Law from 
1990 until 1994. 
††† Caitlinrose Fisher received her J.D. summa cum laude from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School in 2015. She is currently a law clerk on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
The authors wish to thank Frederick A.O. (Fritz) Schwarz, Jr., Elizabeth 
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  INTRODUCTION   
Our nation’s founders put in place constitutional checks, 
such as the Fourth Amendment and three co-equal branches of 
government, to ensure that the very constitutional liberties we 
fight for abroad are not undermined domestically in the name 
of “foreign intelligence” and “national security.” Since the 
founding of our republic, however, the government has strug-
gled with maintaining an appropriate balance between gather-
ing intelligence for national security purposes and protecting 
the privacy of United States citizens throughout the course of 
that intelligence gathering. Often in times of “crisis,” executive 
and intelligence officials act with impunity under the guise of 
national security, eroding the very values that are the bedrock 
of our constitutional republic.  
In response to executive overreach in the mid-twentieth 
century, the United States Senate formed the United States Se-
lect Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Re-
spect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee)2—a com-
mittee charged with investigating overreach and illegal 
activities by the executive branch.3 The revelations of that 
committee led to significant reform, including: (1) the perma-
nent establishment of congressional intelligence committees to 
oversee intelligence agencies, and (2) the enactment of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).4 The lessons learned 
by the Church Committee and enshrined in FISA, however, 
were quickly forgotten in the wake of 9/11.5  
 
Goitein, Faiza Patel, and Laura Donohue for their thoughtful comments on 
this Article. We are also grateful to Andrew Lugar, United States Attorney for 
the District of Minnesota, for providing us with a practical perspective of law 
enforcement challenges on the ground. Any errors are, of course, our own. 
Copyright © 2016 by Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein & Caitlinrose Fisher. 
 1. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 9 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMM. REPORT, 
BOOK I]. 
 2. The Church Committee is so named for its chairman, Senator Frank 
Church. 
 3. That committee engaged in the most “thorough investigation ever 
made of United States intelligence” and consisted of a staff of 100, which con-
ducted over 800 interviews, 250 executive hearings, and compiled over 110,000 
pages of documentation. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 7. 
 4. An Act to Authorize Electronic Surveillance to Obtain Foreign Intelli-
gence Information (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978), Pub. L. No. 
95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978)). 
 5. See Margo Schlanger, Infiltrate the NSA, ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/civil-libertarians-need-to 
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Two of the authors previously wrote an essay on the 
“strange and challenging subject” of national security and indi-
vidual justice.6 That essay, as does this Article, drew upon the 
unique perspective of Vice President Mondale to inform the au-
thors’ analysis of the appropriate balance between national se-
curity and personal liberties. As a senator, Vice President 
Mondale served on the Church Committee. In particular, Vice 
President Mondale served as chairman of the subcommittee 
that drafted the Church Committee’s final report on domestic 
intelligence activities. Later, when in the White House, Vice 
President Mondale was not only instrumental to the passage of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act but also served on the 
National Security Council, observing and working with execu-
tive intelligence agencies from a distinct perspective. The Vice 
President is described as someone who recognizes that “[c]ivil 
liberties and protecting homeland security are bound together, 
not inevitable foes,” and “[o]pen government and loyalty are al-
lies rather than tools of subversion.”7 Vice President Mondale 
thus offers a unique, pragmatic, and particularly informed per-
spective on maintaining an appropriate balance between secu-
rity and liberty.  
The parallels between the intelligence community’s over-
reach that catalyzed the formation of the Church Committee 
and the current actions of the intelligence community are trou-
bling.8 We may lack a comprehensive report detailing the ex-
tent of modern government surveillance. But, there is evidence 
of misuse of surveillance technology by the government, and, 
because of a lack of meaningful congressional and judicial over-
sight, we can fairly infer that the government’s use of surveil-
 
-infiltrate-the-nsa/383932 (“The intelligence scandals of the 1970s arose out of 
programs remarkably similar to post-9/11 mass surveillance.”). 
 6. Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein & Monica C. Fahnhorst, National 
Security and the Constitution: A Conversation Between Walter F. Mondale and 
Robert A. Stein, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2011 (2014). 
 7. Lawrence R. Jacobs, Walter F. Mondale: In the Tradition of James 
Madison (Apr. 2008) (unpublished essay), http://mondale.law.umn.edu/pdf/ 
JacobsEssay.pdf. 
 8. Intelligence overreach is neither a partisan nor temporal issue. The 
Committee investigated six administrations from Franklin Roosevelt’s 
through Richard Nixon’s and concluded that all had abused their secret pow-
ers: “intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have been found in every ad-
ministration. They are not the product of any single party, administration, or 
man.” SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND 
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at viii (1976) [hereinafter 
CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II]. 
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lance technology has the potential to infringe on citizens’ con-
stitutional liberties. This Article addresses the myriad ways 
that FISA and today’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISA Court or FISC)—established in response to the Church 
Committee’s revelations—have veered off course from their 
original design, tipping the balance once again toward “nation-
al security” at the cost of fundamental constitutional liberties. 
Part I begins by providing a historical overview of the intersec-
tion between national security and personal liberties—from the 
original intent of the framers, to revelations of the Church 
Committee, to post-9/11 practices exposed by Edward Snowden 
and subsequent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. 
Part II explores the intelligence community’s difficulty balanc-
ing intelligence operations with individual liberties, focusing on 
the ways in which post-9/11 amendments to FISA decrease the 
FISA Court’s ability to serve its intended role as an impartial 
arbiter and check on intelligence agencies. Part III proposes a 
series of reforms that would realign intelligence activities and 
the FISA Court with the findings and recommendations of the 
Church Committee. Finally, Part IV concludes by considering 
broader systemic changes that should be made to ensure the in-
telligence community does not revert back to unconstitutional 
practices in the name of “security” when the next crisis arises.  
Before diving into the delicate topic of the nexus between 
national security and individual liberty, we want to make a few 
points clear. We strongly support two goals: first, a vigorous 
and effective national security program; second, effective con-
straints on that program, to ensure national security is pur-
sued within the bounds of the Constitution. We recognize and 
support the necessity of a strong and effective foreign intelli-
gence program. It is a dangerous world and there are numerous 
real threats to the safety of the United States and its citizens. 
It is a first priority of government to provide for the safety of its 
citizens. An equally important obligation of our government, 
however, is to ensure preservation of the constitutional liber-
ties established by our founders and developed through the 
decades, for which generations of Americans have given their 
lives to defend. We believe—as discussed throughout this Arti-
cle—that it is necessary and possible to develop a strong and 
effective foreign intelligence program within the constitutional 
constraints established by our founders. Such a system is not 
only constitutionally required but also likely to result in more 
effective intelligence operations.  
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I.  TOEING THE LINE BETWEEN SECURITY AND 
LIBERTY—A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE   
After leaving England’s system of unchecked monarchical 
authority, our nation’s founding fathers recognized the im-
portance of enshrining systems of checks and balances and 
separation of powers in the Constitution. One notable constitu-
tional provision is the Fourth Amendment, which has evolved 
along with technology and notions of privacy. Since the found-
ing of our nation, however, the coordinate branches of govern-
ment have struggled with the scope of constitutionally protect-
ed personal liberties, especially in the wake of national 
tragedies such as 9/11. This Part traces the evolution of the re-
lationship between the Fourth Amendment and surveillance in 
the name of “national security,” beginning in Section A with 
seminal cases. Section B then turns to the intelligence commu-
nity’s invasion of personal liberties in the mid-twentieth centu-
ry, which catalyzed the Church Committee and, eventually, 
FISA. Section C discusses fundamental changes Congress made 
to FISA in the wake of 9/11. Those changes eroded the struc-
tural and procedural protections recommended by the Church 
Committee and opened the door to intelligence overreach simi-
lar to what existed before the formation of the Church Commit-
tee. Section D concludes by discussing society’s—and Con-
gress’s—response to that overreach, concluding with an 
overview of the recently enacted FREEDOM Act. This Part sets 
forth the push and pull historically inherent in the govern-
ment’s prioritization of intelligence and individual liberties. 
A. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES  
Central to the constitutional democracy envisioned by the 
founding fathers were personal liberties and privacy interests. 
The framers sought to create a system in which no single indi-
vidual or entity would “be blindly trusted to wield power wise-
ly.”9 This was not only a concern of the framers but also of the 
colonists in general—a core issue throughout ratification was 
whether the Constitution would establish sufficient checks on 
government so that the rights of the individual would not fall 
victim to the powers of the government.10 The Fourth Amend-
 
 9. FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UN-
BALANCED 2 (2007). 
 10. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS 
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ment itself was a response to British kings’ revenue officers’ 
use of “general warrants” to conduct “unrestricted, indiscrimi-
nate searches of persons and homes.”11 Thus, the framers rec-
ognized the importance of individual liberties to the democratic 
society they envisioned and put specific provisions into the 
Constitution to ensure the protection of those liberties, regard-
less of the status of national and foreign policy. 
The Fourth Amendment quickly operated as a check on ex-
ecutive authority, serving the role envisioned by the framers. 
The Fourth Amendment required following certain “judicial 
processes” to curb executive overreach.12 For example, an im-
partial magistrate had to rule on the validity of a search before 
it was conducted.13 These procedural requirements not only 
served to protect individual liberties but also sent a message to 
the executive branch that no person or entity, including those 
wielding the most power in society, was “above the law.”14 
As technology evolved (permitting intelligence agencies to 
collect significantly more information without ever entering a 
home) and intelligence agencies continued to push constitu-
tional boundaries, the Supreme Court stepped in to limit do-
mestic surveillance activities and redefine the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States,15 the Court over-
ruled a prior decision16 and held that the Fourth Amendment 
 
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 
44, 58, 445, 588, 663 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., rev. vol. 1891). 
 11. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 27–28. These “general warrants” 
raise similar concerns to the wiretaps used by the intelligence community to-
day. 
 12. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); see also Byars v. Unit-
ed States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926) (rejecting the argument that an unlawful search 
can be remedied by any evidence of wrongdoing it uncovers). 
 13. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1925). Therefore, 
even if probable cause may have existed, without that determination prior to 
execution of the search, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. See Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963) (noting that the warrant 
requirement insures a “deliberate, impartial judgment” is “interposed between 
the citizen and the police”). 
 14. Rule of law principles, drawn from the Magna Carta, greatly influ-
enced the constitutional framers. One of the key tenants of the rule of law is 
“government by laws and not by men”—a concept attributable to Aristotle. 
See, e.g., Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
293, 297 (2009).  
 15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 16. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment only applied to tangible things, not the 
search and seizure of intangible things, such as conversations. In dissent, Jus-
tice Brandeis criticized the majority’s narrow conception of searches, noting 
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prohibits warrantless electronic surveillance, recognizing that 
electronic surveillance can be just as intrusive as physically en-
tering a private space.17 However, Katz did not involve “nation-
al security,” and the Court declined to consider the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment in the national security context. Injecting 
ambiguity into the opinion, the majority included a footnote 
stating that there may be an exception to the warrant require-
ment in cases involving “national security.”18 Concurring, Jus-
tice Douglas challenged the footnote, arguing that the Presi-
dent (or his agent) could “not [be] detached, disinterested, and 
neutral” in cases involving national security.19 Justice Douglas 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment thus did not permit the 
executive branch to fulfill the inherently incompatible positions 
of adversary, prosecutor, and neutral/disinterested magis-
trate.20  
In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to govern 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance.21 In doing so, Congress 
codified the dicta in Katz and explicitly exempted any surveil-
lance relating to “national security information” from Title III’s 
 
that “[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of es-
pionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping” and questioning how it could 
be “that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of indi-
vidual security.” Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“The Government’s activities in electronically 
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth . . . . The fact that 
the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate 
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”). This holding 
was subsequently codified in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act 
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3711 (1968)). 
 18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 (“Whether safeguards other than prior au-
thorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situa-
tion involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.”). 
 19. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas’s concurrence was 
a response to Justice White’s, which wholeheartedly supported permitting the 
executive alone to determine whether national security permitted deviation 
from the traditional warrant requirements. See id. at 364 (White, J., concur-
ring) (“We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate’s 
judgment if the President of the United States . . . has considered the re-
quirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as rea-
sonable.”). The Church Committee revealed that Presidents and their subordi-
nates abused their power in the very way feared by Justice Douglas—by 
invoking the term “national security” to justify excessive surveillance. 
 20. Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 21. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 §§ 801–804. 
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procedural requirements.22 As later exposed by the Church 
Committee, in the years following Katz and Title III, enforce-
ment officials utilized Title III’s exception and conducted exces-
sive surveillance in the name of “security,” fulfilling Justice 
Douglas’s prophecy. The scope of any national security excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement thus 
quickly returned to the Supreme Court. 
Within five years of Katz and the enactment of Title III, 
the Court was called upon to clarify the scope of Katz’s footnote 
twenty-three. In United States v. United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith),23 the Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless electronic 
surveillance in cases of domestic security. Keith characterized 
Katz as recognizing that the “broad and unsuspected govern-
mental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic 
surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth 
Amendment safeguards.”24 Central to the Court’s reasoning was 
the risk of executive overreach in the name of national security. 
Because executive officers are “charged with . . . investigative 
and prosecutorial dut[ies], [they] should not be the sole judges 
of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing 
their tasks.”25 The Court stressed, however, that its decision 
was limited to domestic security and that the Court expressed 
no opinion on warrantless surveillance of “foreign powers or 
their agents.”26 Despite the Court’s attempts to constrain execu-
tive surveillance authority in Katz and Keith, revelations of ex-
ecutive overreach in the name of “security” soon came to light, 
catalyzing the formation of the Church Committee and Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.  
 
 22. In whole, the Act stated that: 
Nothing . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to 
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation 
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign 
power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to 
the security of the United States, or to protect national security in-
formation against foreign intelligence activities. 
Id. § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)). 
 23. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 24. Id. at 313 (footnote omitted).  
 25. Id. at 317. 
 26. Id. at 321–22. Following Keith, the Justice Department limited war-
rantless wiretapping to cases “involving a ‘significant connection with a for-
eign power, its agents or agencies,’” but did not apply that limitation to the 
NSA’s electronic surveillance programs. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, su-
pra note 8, at 189. 
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B. THE FORMATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHURCH  
COMMITTEE 
For the majority of the twentieth century, the FBI, CIA, 
and NSA escaped meaningful congressional oversight and scru-
tiny. The Church Committee found that there was a “clear and 
sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence 
community and to ensure its accountability.”27 Minimal over-
sight occurred not only so that members of congress could plead 
ignorance of intelligence gathering activities but also because 
intelligence agencies, and the FBI in particular, “[had a] trove 
of embarrassing evidence” they could unleash on any public of-
ficial.28 In the 1970s, however, after the Watergate scandal and 
other revelations of executive overreach, Congress could no 
longer plead willful blindness.29 On January 27, 1975, Congress 
established the Senate Select Committee to Study Government 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activity—or “Church 
Committee”—to investigate the “allegations of abuse and im-
proper activities by the intelligence agencies” and “take action 
to bring the intelligence agencies [within] the constitutional 
framework.”30 The Church Committee found that the executive 
branch had engaged in decades of warrantless electronic sur-
veillance under the guise of “national security,” predominantly 
by relying on “vague” and “fuzzy loopholes” in the law.31  
 
 27. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 15; see also 
SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 20 (noting that it was “easier” and “safer” to 
give intelligence agencies “a free pass than to do any oversight”). As Senator 
Mike Mansfield observed, it was “fashionable . . . for members of Congress to 
say that insofar as the intelligence agencies were concerned, the less they 
knew about such questions, the better.” Id. 
 28. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 19–20.  
 29. Id. at 20. 
 30. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at III (Letter of 
Transmittal by Senator Frank Church, Committee Chairman). The Commit-
tee’s charge was two-fold: first, the Committee investigated charges of wrong-
doing; second, and more important to our inquiry, the Committee sought “to 
learn enough about [the intelligence agencies’] past and present activities to 
make the legislative judgments required to assure the American people that 
whatever necessary secret intelligence activities were being undertaken were 
subject to constitutional processes.” Id. at 5. As an example of the type of ille-
gal government activity to be investigated, the Senate listed “CIA domestic 
activities.” CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 1 n.1. 
 31. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 27–29; see, e.g., CHURCH COMM. 
REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 302 (describing the exceedingly broad and 
vague “foreign intelligence” standard). For example, the CIA positively en-
gaged in subversion and sabotage under a vague catchall provision of the 1957 
National Security Act, which authorized the CIA “to perform such other func-
tions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
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The scope of domestic surveillance was troubling. Often, 
groups and individuals were targeted for their political opinion 
rather than any risk to national security. Under the guise of 
“national security,” intelligence agencies collected information 
on: women who attended “Women’s Liberation Movement” 
meetings;32 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., members of the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), and other supporters of the civil rights movement;33 
anti-Vietnam protestors;34 student groups, including Students 
for a Democratic Society and “every Black Student Union and 
similar group”;35 and even members of congress.36 The FBI 
gathered intelligence about the above-mentioned (and other) 
groups allegedly to determine whether communists were infil-
trating organizations, although the FBI also documented legit-
imate activities unrelated to communist infiltration.37  
Intelligence agencies collected intelligence through a varie-
ty of means. Agencies “frequently wiretapped and bugged 
American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant.”38 
The NSA obtained millions of private telegrams from 1947 to 
1975 under a secret arrangement with private telegraph com-
panies.39 The CIA also instituted a mail-opening program, fo-
cusing on mail sent between the Soviet Union and United 
States.40 The CIA and NSA would then share the information 
collected (which rarely distinguished between foreign and do-
mestic targets) with the FBI, for domestic law enforcement 
purposes.41 Despite the clear infringements on individual priva-
 
National Security Council may from time to time direct.” CHURCH COMM. RE-
PORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 44. 
 32. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 7. 
 33. Id. at 7–9, 50, 71–72, 167. The Church Committee collected extensive 
information on the surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The FBI 
launched a campaign against Dr. King intended to “‘neutralize’ him as an ef-
fective civil rights leader.” Id. at 11. Attorney General Robert Kennedy ap-
proved the bugging of Dr. King’s home. Id. at 118. For an in-depth discussion 
of surveillance of Dr. King, see id. at 219–23. 
 34. Id. at 49. The CIA collected intelligence on anti-war protestors at the 
request of both Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Id. at 98. 
 35. Id. at 8–9. 
 36. Id. at 8–10. 
 37. See id. at 48–49, 81–82, 175, 179–80. 
 38. Id. at 12. Government officials would often break in and install micro-
phones to capture the conversations of individuals and organizations. See id. 
at 13, 60. 
 39. See id. at 6, 168. 
 40. See id. at 58–59. 
 41. See id. at 59. 
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cy, “question[s] of legality or constitutionality” were either not 
raised or consciously disregarded.42 
The Church Committee identified four fundamental insti-
tutional flaws that permitted intelligence agencies to subvert 
personal liberties in the name of national security. First, na-
tional security institutions and laws were organized under 
“ambiguous laws and fuzzy instructions.”43 Malleable terms 
such as “subversion,” “national security,” and “foreign intelli-
gence” provided intelligence agencies with fodder to collect ex-
cessive information.44 Second, senior executive officials fur-
thered a culture of impunity by giving implicit orders to violate 
the law.45 Third, the intelligence community presumed absolute 
and permanent secrecy of their operations.46 Without anticipat-
ed testing of actions by Congress and the public, those agencies 
acted with greater impunity and less adherence to reasonable 
interpretations of the law. Finally, due to a lack of congression-
al oversight,47 intelligence agencies acted like a “monarchical 
executive,”48 unaccountable to any coequal branch of govern-
ment. Essentially, the Committee reaffirmed a principle recog-
nized by the founding fathers—“unchecked power is prone to 
unwise, inefficient application and . . . leads inescapably to 
abuse.”49 
Because of the Church Committee’s revelations, Congress 
created the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelli-
gence to provide the requisite “oversight” of intelligence agen-
 
 42. Id. at 140–46. 
 43. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 5; see CHURCH COMM. REPORT, 
BOOK I, supra note 1, at 4 (“Where statutes do exist, as with the CIA, they are 
vague and have failed to provide the necessary guidelines defining missions 
and limitations.”); CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 165 
(“The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans 
contributed to overbreadth.”). 
 44. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 31; see also CHURCH COMM. RE-
PORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 24–28 (describing the ambiguity of the term 
“subversive”).  
 45. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 11. 
 46. See id. at 11–12. 
 47. See id. at 11 (“[I]t is clear that Congress did not carry out effective 
oversight.”).  
 48. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 2–3. The “monarchical executive” 
theory is essentially one of “unchecked presidential power.” Id. at 1–2. As not-
ed by Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., this theory has been “deployed to many 
ends,” including “to spy on Americans’ telephone calls and e-mails in violation 
of federal statutes and, at times, the Fourth Amendment; and to infiltrate and 
keep watch on domestic groups protesting government policy.” Id. at 2. 
 49. Id. at 50. 
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cies,50 and enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
197851 to provide a more concrete legal framework capable of 
limiting and guiding intelligence agencies. These changes were 
intended to “strik[e] a fair and just balance between protection 
of national security and protection of personal liberties.”52 The 
intelligence committees would serve as a permanent check on 
executive authority, deterring intelligence agencies from engag-
ing in the overreach that led to the formation of the Church 
Committee. And newly enacted legislation, such as FISA, es-
tablished more concrete statutory guidance and limitations on 
the power of those agencies. The Act also created the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.53 FISC is “a specialized Article 
III court established under FISA to review and approve gov-
ernmental applications” seeking to obtain intelligence through 
certain methods.54 FISA also created the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), to which the 
government may appeal denials of applications to conduct sur-
veillance.55  
From 1978 to 2001, Congress and the executive branch ad-
hered to the model recommended by the Church Committee, 
 
 50. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. Res. 591, 94th Cong. (1976). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801 (1978)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7 (1977) (stating that Congress 
enacted FISA “in large measure [as] a response to the revelations that war-
rantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security ha[d] been se-
riously abused”).  
 52. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7.  
 53. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 103(a). FISC is com-
posed of eleven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
United States. Additionally, there is a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
of Review, with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the government. That court 
is composed of three judges designated by the Chief Justice. For a general 
background of the composition of FISC, see generally ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33833, THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE COURT AND THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
COURT OF REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW (2007) (discussing the creation and structure 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence 
Court of Review). 
 54. EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43459, OVERVIEW OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NSA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 1–2 (2014). Initially, FISA only authorized wiretaps and bugs, 
but it was subsequently amended to cover physical searches, pen registers and 
trap and trace devices, and business records. See Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601(2), 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–
05 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1843 (1999)); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807(a)(3), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 1827 (1994)). 
 55. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 103(b). 
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and three key components of FISA and the FISA Court re-
mained intact. First, the FISA Court only approved applica-
tions for individualized warrants before a search occurred.56 Se-
cond, those warrants only approved gathering of intelligence 
information from “foreign power[s]” or “agents of foreign pow-
er[s].”57 And third, the information requested, if it related to or 
concerned a United States person, had to be “necessary” to ob-
taining foreign intelligence information.58 Those key compo-
nents changed drastically in the wake of 9/11.  
C. ALTERING THE BALANCE POST 9/11 
Two laws significantly changed FISA and FISC in the 
wake of 9/11. First, in 2001, Congress enacted the PATRIOT 
Act,59 which expanded the scope of information subject to FISA 
orders.60 Second, in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA),61 
Congress created a statutory regime for collecting foreign intel-
ligence information, which was previously governed by execu-
tive order.62 Together, these changes opened the door for the 
executive branch to expand the scope of signals intelligence—or 
electronic communications and business records about those 
communications—collected.63 Each statutory change will be ad-
dressed in turn.  
 
 56. The Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel relied on the indi-
vidual warrant requirement to establish FISA/FISC’s conformity with Article 
III of the Constitution.  
 57. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 101(e)(1)(A) (defining 
“foreign intelligence information”). 
 58. Id. § 101(e)(1). 
 59. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  
 60. As will be discussed later, it was a broad view of the term “relevant” 
that led FISC to secretly rule that the PATRIOT Act permitted bulk collection 
of metadata.  
 61. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801 (2008)). 
 62. See generally Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of In-
ternational Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 
144–53 (2015) [hereinafter Donohue, Section 702] (describing the evolution of 
the FISA Amendments Act). 
 63. Signals intelligence is the information captured pursuant to current 
programmatic surveillance. See Nat’l Research Council, Bulk Collection of 
Signals Intelligence: Technical Options S-2 (2015) (prepublication copy). 
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The PATRIOT Act modified various provisions of FISA and 
expanded the scope of information subject to FISC warrants.64 
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the government could request busi-
ness records solely from common carriers if and only if the gov-
ernment provided “specific and articulable facts” that the per-
son the records pertained to was a “foreign power or agent of a 
foreign power.”65 Under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the 
FBI could now apply to FISC for an order permitting “the pro-
duction of any tangible thing[]” (not only business records) from 
any business (not only common carriers).66 Moreover, while the 
government previously had to show that the subject of the 
business records request was a foreign power or its agent, the 
new law permitted the government to obtain any tangible thing 
so long as there were reasonable grounds to believe it was “rel-
evant” to an authorized investigation.67 The “foreign pow-
er/agent of a foreign power” requirement was similarly replaced 
with a mere “relevance” standard for Pen Register and Trap 
and Trace orders, which allow the government to track num-
bers calling in or from a given phone number.68 These changes 
reduced FISC’s ability to thoroughly examine and question the 
government’s need for a given search warrant.  
Although the PATRIOT Act seemingly retained the re-
quirement of individualized court orders, the administration 
 
 64. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amended 50 U.S.C. § 1861 and ex-
panded the ability of intelligence agencies to obtain information from busi-
nesses. USA PATRIOT Act § 215 (permitting the FBI to request the produc-
tion of “any tangible thing[]”). Prior to the PATRIOT Act, Congress amended 
various provisions of FISA to cover: (1) physical searches, Intelligence Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423, 
3445 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829 (1994)); (2) pen-trap and 
trace devises, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 
105-272, § 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–10 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1841–1846 (1998)); and (3) searches of business records, id. § 602. See gen-
erally Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitu-
tional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 793–802 (2014) [here-
inafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection] (describing evolution of FISA and 
the metadata collection program). 
 65. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 § 602. 
 66. USA PATRIOT Act § 501 (emphasis added) (expanding the definition 
of “business record” to include “any tangible things (including books, records, 
papers, documents, and other items)”); see Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, 
supra note 64, at 797–98. 
 67. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 § 505. 
 68. Id. § 404(c)(2) (requiring the government to certify that the “infor-
mation likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or 
international terrorism investigation”); see 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining 
pen register); id. § 3127(4) (defining trap and trace device). 
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ignored that requirement. Relying on the President’s “inherent” 
constitutional authority, the executive branch engaged in “bulk 
collection” of both phone and Internet metadata without any 
involvement of the FISA Court.69 Eventually, to salvage these 
programs, the administration sought to bring them under the 
auspices of FISA and the FISA Court, arguing that the term 
“relevant” justified mass collection of phone and Internet data.70 
In decisions that remained confidential until Snowden’s disclo-
sures, FISC accepted this seemingly limitless interpretation of 
the word “relevant.”71 Indeed, a 2013 FISC decision went so far 
as to hold that all Americans’ phone records were relevant to 
authorized international terrorism investigations because they 
may be used in some unforeseen, future search.72 
The PATRIOT Act modified not only the scope of searcha-
ble material but also the standard applicable to obtaining sur-
veillance authorization. Previously, the executive branch had to 
establish that the “purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain 
intelligence information. Courts interpreted the “purpose” lan-
guage to mean “primary purpose,” requiring the government to 
show that gathering foreign intelligence (rather than, say, 
criminal prosecution) was the primary purpose of the surveil-
 
 69. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 
(Jan. 17, 2007) (explaining the administration’s position on the legality of the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OVER-
SIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION’S ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT OF 2008 (2012) [hereinafter OIG REPORT, SECTION 702]; 
SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 125 (describing the development of FISA 
after September 11, 2001). After public exposure of that warrantless surveil-
lance, the administration brought its mass surveillance program once again 
before the FISC. See OIG REPORT, SECTION 702, supra, at 9–11. 
 70. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SUR-
VEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 12 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB RE-
PORT, SECTION 702]. A separate type of information is also collected under Sec-
tion 702, referred to as “upstream” collection. Rather than merely collecting 
information to or from a given selector, upstream collection captures entire 
transactions and communications travelling across the Internet “backbone,” 
which may mention, but do not contain, the selector. See id.  
 71. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Re-
quiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, slip 
op. at 18–23 (FISA Ct. 2013), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
BR%2013-109%20Order-1.pdf; see also ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 22 
(2015) (explaining FISC’s interpretation of the word “relevance”). 
 72. In re Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-109, 
slip op. at 28–29. 
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lance.73 The PATRIOT Act amended FISA so that gathering in-
telligence only had to be a “significant purpose” of the surveil-
lance,74 and permitted law enforcement agencies to share in-
formation acquired through FISA searches.75 This change 
permitted the executive branch to comingle law enforcement 
and intelligence activities to a greater extent and inserted into 
the statutory scheme the ambiguity inherent in the term “sig-
nificant.”76  
In 2008, Congress altered FISC’s role and relationship to 
the executive branch once again through the FISA Act 
Amendments, further eroding portions of FISA that codified the 
Church Committee’s structural and procedural recommenda-
tions. Of particular relevance, Section 702 codified new proce-
dures for targeting non-United States persons abroad. First, 
the FAA eliminated the requirement for individual court or-
ders, even if a United States citizen’s information would be col-
lected, so long as the American was not the “target” of the sur-
veillance.77 The NSA then interpreted the FAA to permit not 
 
 73. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2012)).  
 74. Id.; see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(holding that FISA did not require the government to show that its primary 
purpose in undertaking the surveillance was not criminal prosecution and that 
the “significant purpose” test did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
 75. USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b)(1) (“Any investigative or law enforcement 
officer . . . who by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained 
knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or 
evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal 
law enforcement . . . official to the extent such contents include foreign intelli-
gence . . . .”); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: PRESERVING 
LIFE AND LIBERTY, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/what_is_the_patriot_ 
act.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (noting that the PATRIOT Act “facilitated 
information sharing and cooperation among government agencies so that they 
can better ‘connect the dots’”). 
 76. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate Gen., 
Nat’l Sec. Litig. & Intelligence Law, to Judge Advocates (Sept. 4, 2003), 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/navy0903.pdf (discussing the PATRIOT Act’s 
changes to FISA). This potential for commingling intelligence and enforcement 
activities led to abuse and misstatements to FISC regarding the scope of 
FISC-approved searches. For example, one FISA certification erroneously 
stated “that the target of the FISA [search] was not under criminal investiga-
tion.” In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (FISA Ct. 2002). This led the FISA Court to 
“h[o]ld a special meeting to consider the troubling number of inaccurate FBI 
affidavits in so many FISA applications.” Id.  
 77. However, “if an individual is not known to be a U.S. person . . . then 
the NSA assumes that the individual is a non-U.S. person.” Donohue, Section 
702, supra note 62, at 158 (emphasis added). Information about U.S. persons 
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only acquiring information to and from targets of surveillance 
but also information about targets of surveillance in certain 
contexts, even if the communication was between two non-
foreign individuals.78 The FAA also required the government to 
establish targeting and minimization procedures to reduce the 
risk of capturing non-target communications.79 Unlike the orig-
inal design of FISA, where FISC adjudicated individual war-
rant determinations before any targeting occurred, the FAA 
transformed FISC into a meta-arbiter, approving generally ap-
plicable targeting and minimization procedures that applied af-
ter a search occurred.80  
The FAA also extended the scope of “foreign” targets falling 
within FISC’s protection and jurisdiction. Whereas FISA origi-
nally limited intelligence agencies to collecting information 
from “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers”—language 
that intentionally tracked Keith81—the FAA extended FISC ju-
risdiction to “any non-U.S. person overseas” so long as collect-
ing that intelligence furthered the goals of collecting “foreign 
intelligence.”82 Five years after its enactment, Congress reau-
thorized the FAA with little debate, despite senators previously 
expressing concern over the scope of information collected.83  
 
 
could be acquired in a variety of other ways. For example, information could 
be acquired when a U.S. person communicates with a non-U.S. person or when 
two non-U.S. persons discuss a U.S. person. Also, given the complexity of the 
collection program, sometimes a U.S. person would be “inadvertent[ly]” tar-
geted. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702, supra note 70, at 6. 
 78. Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 161–64. 
 79. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a (2008)).   
 80. Id. For a detailed description of the evolution of the FAA and the 
changes it made to FISA, see Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 124–53. 
 81. The Keith court expressly declined to opine on the government’s sur-
veillance authority over “foreign powers or their agents.” United States v. U.S. 
District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972) (“We have not addressed, 
and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to 
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”).  
 82. Id.  
 83. See Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 156–57. As chronicled by 
national security scholar Laura Donohue, by 2012,  
[M]ore than a dozen senators had joined a letter to Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James R. Clapper, expressing alarm that the intel-
ligence community ha[d] stated that ‘it is not reasonably possible to 
identify the number of people located inside the United States whose 
communications may have been reviewed’ under the FAA. 
Id.  
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 The PATRIOT Act and FAA represented a step back from 
the Church Committee’s structural and procedural recommen-
dations. First, the Committee noted that intelligence agencies 
need specific and restricted statutory mandates—the potential 
for abuse of intelligence authority is too great when agencies 
operate under “fuzzy” and “ambiguous” directives.84 However, 
after 9/11, the warrant parameters were ambiguous: rather 
than being tied to foreign powers and their agents, searches 
just had to be “relevant” to “foreign intelligence” investigations; 
rather than authorizing searches for the primary purpose of 
national security, that purpose just had to be “significant.”85 Se-
cond, the Committee recognized that, to the extent possible, in-
telligence agencies need continuous oversight.86 However, after 
9/11, the FISA Court had to take the government’s word that a 
given search was “relevant” to a foreign intelligence investiga-
tion, and the court no longer pre-approved warrants before a 
search, but rather approved general procedures to apply after 
intelligence agencies gathered information.87 These statutory 
changes represented a return to pre-Church Committee pro-
cesses and tipped the scale once again toward “security” at the 
expense of “liberty.”  
D. THE SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES AND FREEDOM ACT  
The PATRIOT Act and FAA, together with confidential 
statutory and constitutional interpretation on the part of the 
FISA Court, provided intelligence agencies with the necessary 
fodder to act with impunity like pre-Church agencies. Intelli-
gence agencies conducted expansive searches and collected vast 
amounts of private information, all without the public’s 
knowledge. That veil of secrecy fell in June of 2013, when Ed-
ward Snowden, a former NSA contractor and CIA employee, 
began releasing classified information about NSA surveillance 
 
 84. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 85. The 9/11 Commission, for example, found that intelligence agencies 
acted with “little guidance” from Congress in the wake of 9/11 and evolving 
national security threats. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST AT-
TACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 15–16 (2004), http://www.9-11commission 
.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf. 
 86. See id. at 25–26. 
 87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. FISC still approves indi-
vidualized warrants, but this Article focuses on post-9/11 changes to FISC’s 
jurisdiction. 
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activities.88 Among other things, Snowden disclosed a sweeping 
FISC opinion, in which FISC ordered Verizon Communications 
to furnish all telephone metadata to the NSA once a day under 
the auspices of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.89 Regardless of 
whether Snowden is considered a whistleblower or a traitor, he 
catalyzed a conversation about government secrecy, as a result 
of which Congress enacted the FREEDOM Act.90  
On June 2, 2015, one day after the expiration of Section 
215, Congress enacted the FREEDOM Act,91 for the purpose of 
“prohibit[ing] bulk collection of records under Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act.”92 Among other things, the Act requires 
FISC to publish opinions in certain circumstances93 and estab-
lishes a system for the appointment of amicus curiae.94 Accord-
ing to the House Judiciary Report, “[t]he Act creates a new pro-
gram for the targeted collection of telephone metadata, 
provides greater privacy and civil liberties protections for 
Americans, expands existing congressional oversight provi-
sions, and creates greater transparency of national security 
programs operated pursuant to FISA.”95 The FREEDOM Act 
does accomplish each of the aforementioned goals—but, given 
the status quo before its enactment, saying that it “improves” 
liberty protections and congressional oversight is not, by itself, 
saying too much.96  
 
 88. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; 
see also Tom McCarthy, Edward Snowden Identifies Himself as Source of NSA 
Leaks—As It Happened, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-secret-surveillance-lawmakers-live.  
 89. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2 (2015); Ian Black, NSA Spying 
Scandal: What We Have Learned, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2013, 2:48 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/nsa-spying-scandal-what-we 
-have-learned; see also In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for 
an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 
06-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). The NSA collected information from not only 
Verizon but also other U.S. telecommunications providers. See H.R. REP. NO. 
114-109, pt. 1, at 8.  
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2–10 (describing the background 
of, and the need for, legislation).  
 91. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
Effective Discipline over Monitoring (FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). 
 92. H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2.  
 93. See FREEDOM Act § 402. 
 94. See id. § 401. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2.  
 96. Throughout the remainder of this Article we will note where the 
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II.  INFRINGEMENTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN 
THE NAME OF SECURITY   
As discussed in Part I, the PATRIOT Act and FAA inserted 
ambiguity and expansive executive authority—two characteris-
tics the Church Committee recognized contributed to executive 
overreach—into FISA’s framework. Both the intelligence com-
munity, exercising wide-ranging investigative authority, and 
the FISA Court, avoiding questioning executive action in the 
delicate area of national security, embraced this ambiguity and 
newly sanctioned authority. Those structural changes set socie-
ty up for another pre-Church Committee moment, particularly 
when coupled with unnecessary secrecy and a culture of impu-
nity. 
This Part explores the impact the PATRIOT Act and FAA 
had on civil liberties. Lessons learned by the Church Commit-
tee and memorialized in FISA were quickly forgotten in the 
wake of the “War on Terror.” Because of statutory changes to 
FISA, intelligence agencies were in a position to broadly con-
strue “foreign intelligence” and other ambiguous statutory 
terms, and to permit a desire for national security to infringe 
upon citizens’ constitutional liberties. Although we lack a com-
prehensive report detailing executive overreach, there remains 
evidence of misuse of executive authority, and we can infer ad-
ditional, unknown infringements on constitutional liberties are 
occurring.  
Drawing from the findings of the Church Committee and 
intent of FISA’s drafters, this Part discusses where Congress, 
intelligence agencies, and the FISA Court strayed from the 
original design of FISA and FISC. Section A begins by analyz-
ing the bulk collection of individual metadata, via both phone 
and Internet searches. These programs emerged from the PA-
TRIOT Act and were sanctioned by questionable, and secret, 
statutory interpretation on the part of the FISA Court. Section 
B discusses FISC’s role post-FAA as an adjudicator of proce-
dures as opposed to individual cases and controversies. Section 
C pulls back from specific FISC holdings and discusses the cul-
ture of impunity that flourished in the wake of 9/11. This cul-
ture pervaded the relationship between intelligence agencies 
and FISC—with intelligence agencies misleading FISC as to 
the scope of intelligence programs and violating the (limited) 
 
FREEDOM Act has the potential to significantly rein in intelligence overreach 
and also where the Act is ambiguous enough to leave the door open, once 
again, for abuse and misuse of executive authority.  
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restrictions the court imposed on those programs. Finally, Sec-
tion D suggests that all these potential constitutional violations 
continued until Snowden’s disclosures because of a culture of 
secrecy and the de minimis potential for collateral review. 
First, the executive branch increased its invocation of, and ex-
panded the scope of, the state secrets doctrine, precluding judi-
cial review of FISA-related information in public Article III 
courts. Second, FISC engaged in significant confidential statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation. Combined, these actions 
have encroached upon constitutionally protected civil liberties 
and undermined public trust in the government. 
A. BULK COLLECTION  
After 9/11, intelligence agencies began engaging in bulk 
collection of phone and Internet “metadata”97—information 
about the telephone numbers dialed, e-mail addresses contact-
ed, and the time and length of calls/e-mails, as opposed to the 
content of a communication.98 Although this collection initially 
took place without judicial authorization, the FISA Court—via 
confidential opinions—ultimately approved the bulk collection 
of both telephone and Internet data. These rulings placed “few 
limits on the government’s ability to collect and retain large 
amounts of domestic and international telephone records,” but 
did slightly limit the government’s ability to “search or make 
further use of the collected metadata.”99  
The FISA Court held that the collection of telephone and 
Internet metadata is both statutorily—under a broad interpre-
tation of the term “relevance”—and constitutionally author-
 
 97. The term “bulk” is used to distinguish from the “narrower collection of 
metadata pertaining to an identified individual or group of individuals.” LIU 
ET AL., supra note 54, at 2. See id. for a general discussion of the bulk collec-
tion program.  
 98. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 21. For a detailed discussion 
of how much information is obtained from metadata, see Klayman v. Obama, 
957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“[T]he ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the quantity of information 
that is now available and, more importantly, what that information can tell 
the Government about people’s lives.”). 
 99. LIU ET AL., supra note 54, at 3. The limitation on the executive’s au-
thority to search the metadata was scant. First, it only required “reasonable 
articulable suspicion” (RAS)—a lesser standard than probable cause. Id. at 4. 
Second, it was the agency itself (“a relatively small group of NSA personnel”) 
that determined whether RAS existed to search a particular query. Id. After 
the Snowden disclosures, however, President Obama asked FISC to make the 
RAS determination. See id. 
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ized.100 In particular, the court held that metadata “is not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment because users of e-mail [and 
telephones] do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy” of 
“non-content addressing information,” since that information is 
shared with third-party providers, such as Verizon.101 The court 
admitted, however, that it was interpreting FISA to “encom-
pass an exceptionally broad form of collection,” and that such 
an interpretation may not have been appropriate under FISA 
before the PATRIOT Act.102 Essentially, “[b]y 2007, the FISA 
[C]ourt and Congress had together, and mostly in secret, 
broadened FISA into a bulk surveillance statute.”103 
The public remained unaware of this bulk collection until 
Edward Snowden exposed the NSA’s activities in 2013. Once 
exposed to the public, however, civil society—and, to a lesser 
extent, Congress—began mobilizing against the bulk collection 
of metadata. Multiple bills were proposed in Congress that 
would curtail the program, which expired on June 1, 2015.104 
Before Congress acted, however, the Second Circuit issued an 
opinion striking down the bulk collection under Section 215 on 
statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds.105 The court held 
that the government read the term “relevant”—added to FISA 
by the PATRIOT Act—far too broadly,106 reasoning that the 
 
 100. The FISA Court held that “[i]nformation is ‘relevant’ to an authorized 
international terrorism investigation if it bears upon, or is pertinent to, that 
investigation.” In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Or-
der Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-
109, slip. op. at 18 (FISA Ct. Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/BR%2013-109%20Order-1.pdf (quoting Government’s Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investi-
gations To Protect Against Int’l Terrorism, No. BR 05-06, at 13–14 (filed May 
23, 2006)). Although the bulk collection of telephone metadata received greater 
media attention, the reasoning for that opinion came largely from a prior opin-
ion authorizing bulk collection of Internet metadata. See GOITEIN & PATEL, 
supra note 71.  
 101. Internet Metadata Opinion and Order, No. PR-TT [REDACTED], slip 
op. at 19 (FISA Ct. 2006), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/ 
CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf; see also id. at 58–61 (explaining the court’s deter-
mination that the surveillance complied with the Fourth Amendment). 
 102. Id. at 23.  
 103. Schlanger, supra note 5. 
 104. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 3 (2015) (describing the back-
ground of the FREEDOM Act and noting that “various recommendations” for 
reform were proposed before the Act was passed).  
 105. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 106. See id. at 812 (rejecting the government’s argument that metadata is 
relevant if it “may allow the NSA, at some unknown time in the future, utiliz-
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government cannot “collect phone records only because they 
may become relevant to a possible authorized investigation in 
the future.”107 The panel recognized that to hold otherwise 
would be conceding limitless authority to the NSA under Sec-
tion 215.108  
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision and mounting 
public pressure, Congress enacted the FREEDOM Act, which 
technically eliminated Section 215’s authorization of “bulk col-
lection” of metadata.109 The FREEDOM Act, however, was am-
biguous as to whether bulk collection could continue during a 
180-day transition period.110 In June, the FISA Court disagreed 
with the Second Circuit’s statutory interpretation, held that the 
program was statutorily authorized, and permitted its contin-
ued use during the FREEDOM Act’s transition period.111 
The bulk collection of information is a troubling departure 
from the original intent of Congress in enacting FISA against 
the immediate backdrop of the Church Committee’s findings 
and recommendations. This bulk collection represented a re-
turn to pre-Church Committee government practices. Under 
the auspices of broad and ambiguous language, intelligence 
agencies were free to collect vast amounts of information about 
citizens without the individualized protections of the Fourth 
 
ing its ability to sift through the trove of irrelevant data it has collected up to 
that point, to identify information that is relevant”). 
 107. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).  
 108. See id.  
 109. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 5–9 (2015) (describing 
the need for legislation). Enacting the FREEDOM Act was no simple task and 
highlights the controversies often associated with regulating the relationship 
between security and personal liberties. Congress was unable to enact a law 
by the time Section 215 technically expired. The delays resulted in part from a 
filibuster by Senator Rand Paul, who argued that the FREEDOM Act did not 
do enough to protect liberty and privacy. See Jeremy Diamond, Rand Paul 
Wraps 10-Hour “Filibuster” over NSA Surveillance Program, CNN (May 21, 
2015, 7:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/rand-paul-filibuster 
-patriot-act-nsa-surveillance. 
 110. See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, slip op. at 10 (FISA Ct. 
June 29, 2015) (acknowledging that there was a question as to “whether Con-
gress has authorized bulk acquisition of call detail records during the [FREE-
DOM Act’s] interim 180-day period”). 
 111. See id. at 9–11. The court stated that “Second Circuit rulings are not 
binding on the FISC, and this Court respectfully disagrees with that Court’s 
analysis.” Id. at 14–15; see also Charles Savage, Surveillance Court Rules that 
N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can 
-resume-bulk-data-collection.html. 
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Amendment.112 Bulk collection is at odds with FISA’s original 
intent in two ways in particular. First, it puts FISC in the posi-
tion of approving broad searches, as opposed to individual war-
rant applications in concrete and limited cases and controver-
sies. Such broad approvals are not a common characteristic of 
Article III courts. Second, bulk collection increases the possibil-
ity of the misuse of information. FISC itself recognized, and at-
tempted to rein in, the intelligence community’s misuse of the 
diverse material collected.113  
Congress did attempt to address these diversions from 
FISA’s original intent in the FREEDOM Act. In an attempt to 
rein in the “bulk collection” of metadata exposed by Snowden, 
the FREEDOM Act supplements the ambiguous “relevance” 
standard by requiring that a “specific selection term” be used as 
the basis for the production of “tangible things”114 and “pen reg-
ister” searches.115 It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
FREEDOM Act significantly limits the potential for encroach-
ment on First and Fourth Amendment protections and the 
 
 112. For example, the FAA expanded the scope of foreigners that the gov-
ernment could target. The government did not have to show it was targeting a 
“foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign power,” the very key words invoked 
by the Keith Court and used elsewhere in FISA. Instead, the government could 
target any non-U.S. person overseas for the purpose of collecting “foreign intel-
ligence information.” See supra notes 62, 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 113. See infra Part II.C. But cf. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 9–10 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215] (finding that “compliance issues” resulted 
from the complexity and scope of the program, rather than bad faith actions of 
program administrators). 
 114. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 103, 129 Stat. 268, 272 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2015)).  
 115. Id. § 201. It is particularly concerning that the “relevance” standard 
remains in the FREEDOM Act. As discussed above, the bulk collection pro-
gram emerged from exceedingly broad interpretations of the relevance stand-
ard. Although the Second Circuit has rejected FISC’s interpretation of “rele-
vant,” see Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015), 
both FISC and the executive branch have made it clear that they prefer FISC’s 
interpretation to the Second Circuit’s, see Memorandum of Law of the United 
States, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Re-
quiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75 (FISA Ct.  
June 2, 2015), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2015-01% 
20Memorandum%20of%20Law.pdf (arguing that the government should be 
able to continue collecting bulk data during the FREEDOM Act’s transition 
period, despite the Second Circuit’s decision in ACLU v. Clapper). 
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misuse of private information.116 The definition of “specific se-
lection term” is broad enough to include entire Internet Proto-
col (IP) addresses.117 Thus, the government may acquire infor-
mation that hundreds or thousands of non-foreign targets 
visited a given IP address. The Act also permits collections of 
information “two hops” away from an original target—what 
some refer to as “bulky” data—and creates a new phone 
metadata program that allows the NSA to continuously collect 
the phone records, not only of suspected terrorists, but of eve-
ryone with whom they are in contact.118 In the FREEDOM Act, 
Congress addressed a symptom of post-9/11 changes to FISA, 
but did not address the underlying structural wrongs that per-
mitted that symptom to come to fruition—Congress replaced 
one broad and ambiguous statutory directive with another.  
B. BULK ADJUDICATION 
An issue related to the bulk collection of information, 
which occurred in part because of broad and ambiguous statu-
tory language, is the process by which that collection is ap-
proved.119 The most troubling post-9/11 procedural change is the 
FAA’s (potentially unintentional120) amendments to the warrant 
 
 116. See generally David Cole, The New America: Little Privacy, Big Terror, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 2015 (noting that the FREEDOM Act did not ad-
dress myriad issues, including “the NSA’s practices of collecting enormous 
amounts of personal data on and communications of foreigners overseas [(Sec-
tion 702)], even when they are communicating with Americans”). 
 117. In an earlier version of the FREEDOM Act proposed in the Senate, the 
“specific selection term” would have had to “narrowly limit the scope of tangi-
ble things sought to the greatest extent reasonably practicable.” S. 2685, 113th 
Cong. § 107(k)(3) (2014). That language was not adopted by the House. 
 118. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 29. Given that there 
is no known instance where the bulk collection “program made a concrete dif-
ference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation,” we should be par-
ticularly suspect of any new program that strays beyond actual criminal or 
terrorist suspects. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The PCLOB also found that 
there was only “one instance over the past seven years [when] the program 
arguably contributed to the identification of an unknown terrorism suspect,” 
and the FBI would likely have identified that individual even without the use 
of bulk data collection. Id. The report’s findings were based on access to “clas-
sified briefings and documentation.” Id.  
 119. That is, assuming the executive branch invokes the FISA Court’s ju-
risdiction and the FISA Court approves that bulk collection. 
 120. During congressional debates on the FAA, multiple members of 
Congress made statements suggesting that the FAA would still require indi-
vidualized warrants for any surveillance that may implicate a United States 
citizen. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S6379 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of 
Sen. Cardin) (“FISA requires the Government to seek an order or warrant 
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application procedure. Prior to 2008, FISA required FISC to 
approve individualized warrant applications before a given 
search occurred, consistent with the recommendations of the 
Church Committee.121 After 9/11, the executive branch argued 
that such an individualized requirement was no longer practi-
cable given evolutions in technology and the nature of foreign 
enemies, and engaged in bulk collection of metadata without 
the knowledge or approval of FISC. Section 702 of the FAA at-
tempted to appease those executive concerns and permitted the 
executive branch to collect “foreign intelligence” information, so 
long as FISC approved “targeting” and “minimization” proce-
dures, intended to minimize the unlawful collection of infor-
mation about United States citizens.122 Those procedures are 
not applied on individual bases, but rather to “tens of thou-
sands of cases involving [at least] hundreds of millions of com-
munications” annually.123 
Bulk adjudication of this sort is foreign to Article III 
courts. The FAA eliminated the role of the factual nuances and 
intricacies that are inherent in warrant proceedings. Under 
Section 702, the Attorney General and Director of National In-
telligence certify that general categories of information collect-
ed serve to “acquire foreign intelligence information” without 
specifying who will be targeted.124 Although the FISA Court 
does review, and has the power to amend, the government’s 
 
from the FISA Court before conducting electronic surveillance that may in-
volve U.S. persons.” (emphasis added)); 154 CONG. REC. H5763 (daily ed. June 
20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Heather Wilson) (stating that the FAA would 
“protect the civil liberties of Americans and continue to require individualized 
warrants for anyone in the United States or American citizens anywhere in 
the world”); see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 175 (collecting 
statements).  
 121. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 324–26 (de-
scribing authorized investigative techniques); see also supra notes 12–13 and 
accompanying text (describing the importance of certain processes occurring 
before a search). The Church Committee explicitly stated that the executive 
branch lacks authority to “target[] . . . an American for electronic surveillance 
without a warrant.” CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 325. 
 122. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 26. 
 123. Id. at 29. Similar bulk adjudications have been approved by the FISA 
Court under Section 215. See, e.g., Internet Metadata Opinion and Order, No. 
PR-TT [REDACTED], slip op. at 69–71 (FISA Ct. 2006), http://www.dni.gov/ 
files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (describing the procedures the 
NSA must follow when engaging in bulk collection of Internet metadata).  
 124. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702, supra note 70, at 6.  
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targeting and minimization procedures,125 the FISA Court can-
not review the government’s certification that a “targeting” 
procedure serves a “foreign intelligence” purpose.126 This is par-
ticularly problematic because of the arguably tenuous relation-
ship between “foreign intelligence” and the information collect-
ed. Collecting “foreign intelligence” does not even need to be the 
primary purpose of the search—it is sufficient if the infor-
mation “relates to” national security.127 Because of the defer-
ence the court must give the executive branch regarding the 
factual aspect of a “foreign intelligence purpose,” the lack of a 
limiting judicial or statutory definition of that term is trou-
bling.128 As noted by the Church Committee, “foreign intelli-
gence” is an exceedingly broad and malleable term,129 and has 
been utilized by intelligence agencies to expand their power 
and authority beyond its intended scope.130  
 
 125. See id. “The minimization procedures cover the acquisition, retention, 
use, and dissemination of any non-publicly available U.S. person information 
acquired through the Section 702 program.” Id. at 7.  
 126. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 41. Particularly troubling is that 
under current NSA targeting and minimization procedures, a United States 
citizen can be used as an identifier, so long as the search satisfies the other 
Section 702 prerequisites. See Memorandum Opinion, No. [REDACTED], slip 
op. at 22–23 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/ 
October-2011-Bates-Opinion-and%20Order-20140716.pdf; see also GOITEIN & 
PATEL, supra note 71, at 41. 
 127. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 27. 
 128. FISA’s definition of “foreign intelligence” is nearly limitless: 
“Foreign intelligence information” means— 
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States 
person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect 
against—(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts 
of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage, 
international terrorism, or the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities by an in-
telligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of 
a foreign power; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territo-
ry that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is 
necessary to—(A) the national defense or the security of the 
United States; or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the 
United States. 
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2012). 
 129. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 302. 
 130. See id. at 4. Section 702’s language also differs from the remainder of 
FISA, which requires searches to pertain to a “foreign power” or “agent of a 
foreign power”—language that had its genesis in the Supreme Court’s Keith 
opinion. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
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FISC’s actions under Section 702 do not resemble the most 
fundamental roles of Article III courts—judges, adjudicating an 
individual case or controversy, which is capable of redressing a 
wrong or protecting a right. FISC is not even approving a spe-
cific search, as it at least arguably did (and under the FREE-
DOM Act is more likely to do) with regard to the approval of 
bulk data collection. Rather, Section 702 turns FISC into a me-
ta-arbiter of mere search techniques, as opposed to the adjudi-
cator of a specific search request.131 And FISC lacks the author-
ity to question the most fundamental finding in a 702 request—
whether the procedures serve “foreign intelligence” interests. It 
is thus very questionable whether Section 702 comports with 
Article III of the Constitution. 
These bulk adjudications are also the antithesis of the pro-
cedures envisioned by Congress and relied upon by the Justice 
Department in 1978 to justify FISA’s constitutionality. Wheth-
er FISC comported with Article III was a subject of debate in 
1978. The Act satisfied Article III on the margins because at 
least the court adjudicated an actual “case,” similar to a neutral 
magistrate in warrant proceedings. After the FAA, however, 
the court no longer determines the President’s “authority to 
conduct electronic surveillance of a particular target . . . [by] 
apply[ing] standards of law to the facts of a particular case.”132 
Rather, the FISA Court applies general and ambiguous statu-
tory language to (almost always) give judicial credence to intel-
ligence agency procedures in the absence of specific information 
about the search targets. Notably, the FREEDOM Act did not 
amend the Section 702 program, except to the extent it limited 
bulk collection of Internet data to “specific selector terms.” 
Similar to the bulk collection discussed in Section A, the 
bulk adjudication represented a step back from the processes 
recommended by the Church Committee. The FAA placed more 
unchecked authority in the hands of intelligence agencies, and 
did so through ambiguous and broad directives. The structural 
changes that opened the door to bulk adjudication and bulk col-
 
 131. As stated by Laura Donohue, “[FISC] in some ways thus appears to be 
acting in the capacity of an oversight body, generally ensuring that procedures 
are in place and asking the NSA to police itself.” Donohue, Section 702, supra 
note 62, at 195. 
 132. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, 
H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 27–28 (1978) [hereinafter 
Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Hearings] (statement of John M. 
Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel). 
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lection paved the way for intelligence agencies to exceed their 
apparent authority. Similar to the pre-Church Committee era, 
“ambiguous laws and fuzzy instructions,”133 minimal oversight, 
and changing technology opened the door to executive over-
reach.  
C. A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY  
Although we lack a comprehensive Senate report, there is 
evidence that the post-9/11 era greatly resembled executive ac-
tions in the pre-Church Committee era. Like practices uncov-
ered by the Church Committee, after 9/11, executive agencies 
targeted individuals for their political opinions and blurred the 
line between foreign intelligence and national law enforcement. 
A similar culture of impunity seemingly flourished thanks to 
ambiguous statutory directives, minimal oversight, and perva-
sive secrecy. 
President George W. Bush’s “Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram” exemplified the intelligence community’s culture of im-
punity, operating at the highest levels of administration. De-
spite Congress’s generous post-9/11 legislation, the Bush 
administration engaged in secret, warrantless electronic sur-
veillance within the United States. The President’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program authorized the NSA to intercept commu-
nications of individuals “linked to” Al-Qaeda.134 After the New 
York Times reported leaked information about the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, the administration had to retroactively 
justify its actions. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales couched 
the program—and the administration’s failure to seek FISC 
approval—in the need for “speed and agility” when responding 
to Al-Qaeda.135 The Bush administration posited that the Presi-
dent possessed inherent constitutional authority “to order war-
rantless foreign intelligence surveillance within the United 
 
 133. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 5; see CHURCH COMM. REPORT, 
BOOK II, supra note 8, at 169–72 (describing the effect inadequate statutory 
guides had on the overbreadth of intelligence gathering). 
 134. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Pat Roberts and John D. Rockefeller, IV, Senate Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and Peter Hoekstra and Jane Harmon, 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 
22, 2005) (describing “legal authority” supporting the NSA’s collection activi-
ties).  
 135. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales to Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, 
supra note 69, at 1; see also Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts 
et al., supra note 134, at 5 (“FISA could not have provided the speed and agili-
ty required for the early warning detection system.”).  
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States,” citing a classified FISC decision, the (ambiguous) Keith 
case, and Justice White’s concurrence in Katz—shaky authori-
ty, to say the least, for such a sweeping constitutional interpre-
tation.136  
The President’s reliance on “inherent authority” was at 
odds with FISA’s text and legislative history. The Church 
Committee Domestic Task Force’s first two formal recommen-
dations stated: (1) “[t]here is no inherent constitutional author-
ity for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the 
law,” and (2) “[n]o executive directive or order may be issued 
which would conflict with [] statutes” implementing the Com-
mittee’s recommendations with regard to “federal domestic se-
curity activities.”137 Codifying the Church Committee’s recom-
mendation, FISA specifies that it provides the “exclusive 
means” by which domestic electronic surveillance for national 
security purposes can be conducted.138 A Senate Report stated 
that the “exclusive means” statement should “put[] to rest the 
notion that Congress recognizes an inherent Presidential power 
to conduct surveillance in the United States.”139 Eventually, 
parts of the Terrorist Surveillance Program evolved into Sec-
tion 702, one of the broadest and most ambiguous grants of ex-
ecutive authority under FISA today.140 The evolution from the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program to Section 702 is a paradigmat-
ic example of executive overreach and secrecy breeding further 
overreach.  
Overreach occurred within the confines of FISC’s jurisdic-
tion as well, often because the government interpreted FISC’s 
orders in a way that “strain[ed] credulity.”141 Despite amend-
 
 136. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts et al., supra note 
134, at 2. 
 137. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 293, 297. 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2012). FISA built upon Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1968)), which established rules for 
domestic government wiretaps, but did not explicitly govern wiretaps related 
to national security.  
 139. BIRCH BAYH, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, S. REP. NO. 
95-701, at 71–72 (1978) (emphasis added).  
 140. See PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702, supra note 70, at 5–6. The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court reinterpreted FISA and gave life to the pro-
gram once again after President George W. Bush’s attorney general refused to 
reauthorize the program “based on the president’s bare say-so.” Schlanger, su-
pra note 5. 
 141. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, 
slip op. at 5 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009). 
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ments to FISA that substantially broadened the NSA’s ability 
to collect telephone and Internet communications,142 the NSA 
repeatedly violated—and exceeded the scope of—FISC orders. 
In response to those violations, in 2009, FISC required the NSA 
to submit its queries of bulk metadata on a “case-by-case ba-
sis,” even though the NSA itself had previously been determin-
ing whether it had “reasonable articulable suspicion” to search 
the database.143 FISC enforced that case-by-case requirement 
because of “NSA non-compliance with the FISC’s previous or-
ders”—noncompliance that the Department of Justice, not the 
NSA, reported to FISC.144 Even after the 2009 “sanction”145 of 
actually submitting individualized search queries to FISC, the 
NSA once again arguably exceeded its court authorization. The 
NSA misrepresented to FISC the extent of its Internet commu-
nication collections, sparking one FISC judge to state that 
“[t]he Court is troubled that the government’s revelations re-
garding NSA’s acquisition of Internet transaction mark the 
third instance in less than three years in which the government 
has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the 
scope of a major collection program.”146  
On Christmas Eve of 2014, in response to a Freedom of In-
formation Act lawsuit, the NSA released a “heavily-redacted” 
report, which summarized the misuse of information and 
search technology from 2001 to 2013.147 The agency stated that 
 
 142. Even FISC’s interpretations “push statutory language to its limit.” See 
Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 122. 
 143. LIU ET AL., supra note 54, at 4–5. 
 144. Id. at 5; see also In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, at 18–
20. 
 145. It is interesting that limiting FISC to its original role in national secu-
rity-related search proceedings was considered a “sanction.” 
 146. Memorandum Opinion, No. [REDACTED], slip. op. at 16 n.14 (FISA 
Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates 
-Opinion-and%20Order-20140716.pdf.  
 147. David Lerman, U.S. Spy Agency Reports Improper Surveillance of 
Americans, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2014-12-24/spy-agency-to-release-reports-documenting 
-surveillance-errors. It is hard to believe that releasing the documents on 
Christmas Eve was unintentional. Perhaps the NSA hoped that individuals 
would be on holidays, paying less attention to the news cycle. This possibility 
was noted by more than one news agency, one of which stated that the NSA 
released the report “[w]ith little fanfare,” “quietly publish[ing] a trove of de-
classified data.” Javier E. David, NSA Declassified Reports Showing US Priva-
cy Breaches, CNBC (Dec. 27, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/27/ 
nsa-declassified-reports-showing-inadvertent-us-surveillance.html; see also 
Nicky Woolf, ACLU Accuses NSA of Using Holiday Lull To “Minimise Impact” 
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the “vast majority of compliance incidents involve unintention-
al technical or human error.”148 Unsurprisingly—given FISC’s 
role as approver of general retention techniques but not indi-
vidualized searches—some acquisition of information about 
United States persons occurred because of “overly broad or 
poorly constructed database queries.”149 There were also in-
stances, however, of “intentional misuse” of the bulk collection 
systems.150 These examples of “intentional misuse” of infor-
mation are similar to those uncovered by the Church Commit-
tee.151  
Although there is evidence of abusive use of surveillance, 
that evidence is arguably not as extreme as that uncovered by 
the Church Committee—there is not as much evidence of the 
extreme practices of using surveillance to disrupt social justice 
 
of Documents, GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2014/dec/26/aclu-nsa-documents-christmas-eve-lessens-impact.  
 148. NSA Reports to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), 
NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/Intelligence 
OversightBoard.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).  
 149. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, REPORT TO THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD 
ON NSA ACTIVITIES—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 2 (Mar. 4, 2013). The 
number of searches that were “overly broad” is redacted from the report, mak-
ing it difficult to assess the average accuracy of NSA searches. See id.  
 150. NSA Reports to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), su-
pra note 148. 
 151. See generally supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text. The Church 
Committee found that “intelligence agencies [] frequently wiretapped and 
bugged American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant,” CHURCH 
COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 12, permitting “the Government to 
generate vast amounts of information—unrelated to any legitimate govern-
ment interest—about the personal and political lives of American citizens,” 
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF RE-
PORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, SEN. 
REP. NO. 94-755, BOOK III, at 332 (1976). Since 9/11, the NSA has likewise re-
tained wholly domestic e-mails obtained incidentally, including e-mails that 
contain information about U.S. persons, and retained that information just 
“because the information may prove relevant in the future.” GOITEIN & PATEL, 
supra note 71, at 38. This broad array of information has allegedly been used 
in ways that infringe on the protected First and Fourth Amendment rights of 
individuals and organizations. The Church Committee also found that intelli-
gence agencies targeted domestic groups and individuals, including civil rights 
organizations and Martin Luther King, Jr. See, e.g., CHURCH COMM. REPORT, 
BOOK II, supra note 8, at 51–53. Civil rights organizations today are likewise 
concerned with unauthorized searches of their private information, resulting 
in a chilling of their First Amendment rights. See generally Brief for Nat’l 
Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Plaintiffs, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 
(6th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-2095, 06-2140).  
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movements and harass political outsiders.152 But that does not 
mean the abuse is not occurring and that the potential for mis-
use of information is not chilling First Amendment-protected 
expression.153 Snowden’s disclosures revealed that, post 9/11, 
the NSA and FBI covertly monitored e-mails of prominent Mus-
lim-Americans ranging from politicians to civil rights activ-
ists.154 Snowden disclosed that the administration deliberately 
masked evidentiary trails to hide any evidence that originated 
from a FISA warrant from criminal defendants (parallel con-
struction), so that the FISA searches could not be challenged in 
criminal proceedings.155 To assume more unconstitutional sur-
veillance is not occurring is to ignore the lessons learned after 
the Cold War—“[i]n time of crisis, the Government will exercise 
its power to conduct domestic activities to the fullest extent. 
The distinction between legal dissent and criminal conduct is 
easily forgotten.”156 
The potential for the misuse of intelligence information is 
particularly troubling because of the inextricable relationship 
between intelligence and law enforcement. The PATRIOT Act 
amended FISA to permit greater coordination between intelli-
gence and law enforcement agencies while simultaneously ex-
panding the scope of information subject to FISC-approved 
searches.157 Under new standards, the NSA could conduct sur-
veillance so long as it was a “significant”—as opposed to the 
 
 152. See, e.g., CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 10–13 
(summarizing the Domestic Task Force’s findings on the use of illegal or im-
proper means of covert action). 
 153. For a discussion of the ways in which United States persons have al-
ready changed their behavior to avoid federal surveillance of First Amend-
ment protected expression, see Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Priva-
cy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www 
.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-snowden. 
 154. See Glenn Greenwald & Murtaza Hussain, Meet the Muslim-American 
Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On, INTERCEPT (July 8, 2014, 
11:01 PM), http://theintercept.com/2014/07/09/under-surveillance. Also, as dis-
cussed further below, there is the potential for misuse of NSA-acquired infor-
mation by the FBI when conducting purely domestic law enforcement activi-
ties. See infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text. 
 155. See, e.g., John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, U.S. Direct Agents To Cov-
er Up Program Used To Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:25 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805 
(discussing governmental surveillance of domestic drug offenders). 
 156. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 289; see also id. at 
291 (“The natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of power.”). 
 157. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (cod-
ified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1832(a)(7)(B) (2001)). 
  
2284 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2251 
 
primary—purpose of the search.158 This change in language led 
some analysts to conclude that law enforcement may be the 
primary purpose for a search.159 Further, the FBI can search 
the bulk databases collected through FISC order.160 Because of 
the NSA’s history of non-compliance with court minimization 
procedures and broad, poorly worded queries, the FBI may then 
access databases with information about United States citizens. 
The FBI thus is able to end run the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment—the Supreme Court has made it clear that a war-
rant is required to conduct surveillance of Americans’ commu-
nications in cases that are not foreign intelligence investiga-
tions.161 
Thus, even if we assume every individual searching an 
NSA database is searching for information to further “foreign 
intelligence”—a dubious assumption given historical practices 
by the intelligence community—information about United 
States persons is vulnerable to collection and analysis in con-
travention of the Constitution. For persons who may have their 
civil liberties violated due to an accidental broad query or an 
intentional misuse of law enforcement power, there are few 
ways to learn of those abuses and even fewer ways to challenge 
them in a court.  
D. BARRIERS TO COLLATERAL REVIEW 
Despite the aforementioned issues currently plaguing ex 
ante FISC authorization of intelligence gathering, it is incredi-
bly difficult for the public to learn of intelligence gathering 
practices and challenge them ex post. As a former FISC judge 
publicly stated, unlike the subjects of traditional warrants, sub-
jects of FISC searches are unlikely to learn of, let alone be able 
to challenge, the information acquired by a FISC-approved 
search.162 The government is supposed to notify criminal de-
fendants if FISC-acquired evidence is used to build the gov-
 
 158. Id. 
 159. For example, one reported breach occurred when an individual used 
the signals intelligence system to locate someone believed to be kidnapped. 
Woolf, supra note 147.  
 160. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 39. 
 161. See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316–18 
(1972) (holding that, in general, the government must secure a warrant before 
engaging in domestic electronic surveillance). 
 162. James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinon/a-better-secret-court.html. 
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ernment’s criminal case,163 but Snowden disclosed a policy of at-
tempting to hide the trail of evidence that originated from a 
FISC order.164 Furthermore, because the majority of foreign in-
telligence investigations never result in a criminal prosecution, 
most targets are never notified that surveillance occurred.165 
Specific challenges to searches are difficult to mount, so it is 
paramount that there is transparency in FISC proceedings so 
that those most likely to be targeted may be able to satisfy Ar-
ticle III’s standing requirements. The Church Committee rec-
ognized that a culture of secrecy limited testing of intelligence 
practices by Congress and the public, and contributed to execu-
tive overreach. Unnecessary secrecy, however, remains a key 
component of post-9/11 intelligence practices. There are two 
particular broad policies that currently limit more general chal-
lenges to surveillance—the expansion of the state secrets doc-
trine and FISC’s confidential constitutional and statutory in-
terpretations. 
1. The State Secrets Doctrine  
One way in which the government has attempted to limit 
challenges to programmatic surveillance and the collection of 
citizens’ private information is through the invocation of the 
“state secrets” doctrine,166 created in its modern form by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds.167 In Reynolds, the 
 
 163. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d) (2012).  
 164. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 165. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that even 
when a criminal prosecution is brought as a result of FISC-acquired evidence, 
it remains difficult for the defendant to challenge that evidence. The govern-
ment notice of FISC-collected evidence often does not include the basis of col-
lection (who was the “foreign agent,” what statutory provision the search was 
authorized under, etc.), leaving defense counsel unable to effectively bring a 
motion to suppress the evidence. See Faiza Patel, How a Case of Stolen Corn 
Seeds Shows the Problem with the FISA Court, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 1, 2015, 
8:59 AM), http://www.justsecurity.org/21709/stolen-corn-seeds-problem-fisa 
-court. 
 166. Very little is known “about how the executive branch actually uses the 
privilege—who invokes it, under what circumstances it is invoked, how fre-
quently it has been threatened, and to what end.” Laura K. Donohue, The 
Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 79 (2010) [hereinafter 
Donohue, State Secrets]. National security scholar Laura Donohue has, how-
ever, written a comprehensive and thoughtful article on the issue. Id. In that 
article, she notes that the state secrets privilege has “played a significant role 
in the executive branch’s national security litigation strategy.” Id. at 87.  
 167. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). For an overview of the Reynolds opinion, see 
FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR., DEMOCRACY IN THE DARK: THE SEDUCTION OF 
GOVERNMENT SECRECY 208–09 (2015).  
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Court discussed a common-law privilege against revealing mili-
tary or state secrets and held that courts should treat a docu-
ment as privileged if an executive official certified that the doc-
ument contained sensitive information.168 Furthermore, the 
court should do so without reviewing the document to ensure 
executive honesty when invoking that privilege.169 The three 
Reynolds dissenters stated their support of the Third Circuit’s 
opinion, which recognized the importance of courts as a check 
on the constitutionality of executive and legislative action.170 
And those dissenters were correct to worry, since subsequent 
courts “have viewed assertions of the privilege as a virtual ‘au-
tomatic win’ for the Government.”171 Despite the fact that Reyn-
olds limited its remedy to treating a certain document as privi-
leged, recent administrations have more expansively invoked 
that privilege in litigation related to national security.172 
The state secrets doctrine has significantly expanded since 
FISA’s enactment. As originally described in Reynolds, the 
state secrets doctrine was a “privilege” used to shield internal 
government documents that could expose “military matters” 
that affect “national security” from public disclosure.173 Howev-
er, recent administrations have invoked the doctrine as 
grounds for dismissing entire lawsuits.174 In response, some 
courts completely dismiss suits without adequate or logical ex-
planation, often incorrectly invoking the Totten175 doctrine—a 
doctrine that precludes suits to enforce covert espionage 
 
 168. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 169. Id. at 7–8 (“The court itself must determine whether the circumstanc-
es are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a 
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”). 
 170. See id. at 12; see also Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 
1951). 
 171. See S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 5 (2008). 
 172. See id. at 3 (noting that “a strong public perception has emerged that 
sees the privilege as a tool for Executive abuse”). 
 173. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9–10; see, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1139–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying 
state secrets doctrine to shield CIA documents listing sources of intelligence 
information from disclosure), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 174. See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dis-
missing suit when plaintiff’s claims could not be litigated without disclosure of 
secrets protected by the state secrets privilege); see also SCHWARZ, supra note 
167, at 41. The state secrets doctrine has been invoked in four dozen cases 
that stem from the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Donohue, State Secrets, 
supra note 166, at 139–40.  
 175. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
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agreements with the government.176 Whereas Totten does sug-
gest a narrow ground of state secrets that may justify complete 
dismissal of a suit, that narrow ground was not at issue in 
Reynolds—a case that only discussed a privilege, not jurisdic-
tion—and it is not apposite in most cases challenging FISC or-
ders.177  
Challenges remain even in those cases where courts 
properly apply Reynolds. Even if courts do not dismiss the suit 
solely based on “state secrets,” many suits are dismissed none-
theless on procedural and constitutional grounds. For example, 
by precluding access to information collected under Section 702 
and Section 215, the government is able to prevent plaintiffs 
from obtaining the requisite documents to establish standing.178  
The state secrets doctrine is particularly problematic be-
cause there is a tendency for executive officials to invoke it not 
to further national security, but instead to bury some embar-
rassing executive action. The Reynolds opinion itself—along 
with subsequent cases such as Korematsu v. United States179—
highlights the risk of inappropriate invocation of the state se-
crets doctrine. In Reynolds and Korematsu, respectively, there 
is evidence that the executive branch misstated evidence to 
hide its own negligence and misstated the extent of “secret” in-
formation to further an executive policy.180 More recently, the 
state secrets doctrine has been invoked to preclude relief to in-
 
 176. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 2, 8–11 (2005) (describing Totten as pre-
cluding any suit “where success depends upon the existence of [a] secret espio-
nage relationship with the Government”). 
 177. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In Jeppesen, Judge Hawkins persuasively criticized 
the majority’s description of the Totten doctrine, arguing that the doctrine was 
wholly inapplicable where a claim was brought by third-party plaintiffs (not 
government agents) against non-governmental defendants for tortious (not es-
pionage-related) activities. Id. at 1096–97 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 178. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 
653–57, 687–88 (6th Cir. 2007) (“But the plaintiffs do not—and because of the 
State Secrets Doctrine cannot—produce any evidence that any of their own 
communications have ever been intercepted by the NSA, under the [terrorist 
surveillance program], or without warrants.”); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. 
Supp. 2d 899, 919–20 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“By successfully invoking the state se-
crets privilege, the government has foreclosed discovery that would allow the 
plaintiffs to attempt to establish that they are suffering ongoing harm or will 
suffer harm in the future.”). 
 179. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 180. See S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 5 (2008); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Ac-
cess to Government Information Is a Foundation of American Democracy—But 
the Courts Don’t Get It, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 645, 659–62 (2013).  
  
2288 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2251 
 
dividuals tortured by the Bush administration, even when the 
arguably “confidential” information was already publicly dis-
closed.181 “The privilege has . . . become part of a broader 
framework through which the government tries to limit its vul-
nerability.”182 Without adequate “checks” by courts, there is a 
significant risk that executive officials will continue “invoking 
[state secrets] as a shield against embarrassing disclosures,”183 
thus “depriv[ing] the American people of their ability to judge 
the effectiveness of their Government on national security mat-
ters.”184  
The executive branch’s invocation of the state secrets doc-
trine to preclude litigation exacerbates current issues plaguing 
FISC. It provides a further means of insulation from review by 
an Article III court other than the FISA Court. Non-FISA pro-
ceedings are an especially important means of challenging NSA 
collection activities because of the actual adversity between two 
parties, which is almost always lacking in the ex parte proceed-
ings before FISC. Moreover, the drafters of FISA explicitly con-
sidered and drafted a provision addressing the relationship be-
tween information obtained via FISC-approved searches and 
admissible evidence in non-FISC proceedings, leading one 
judge to hold that FISA preempts the state secrets doctrine.185 
Under FISA, the district court may consider certain FISA-
acquired evidence “in camera and ex parte” if the Attorney 
General files an affidavit “that disclosure or an adversary hear-
ing would harm the national security of the United States.”186 
 
 181. See SCHWARZ, supra note 167, at 214–17. 
 182. Donohue, State Secrets, supra note 166, at 95. The state secrets doc-
trine has been invoked not only to limit the government’s vulnerability but al-
so to protect—by extension and without any precedential support from Reyn-
olds—private government contractors. Id. at 95–98.  
 183. Background on the State Secrets Privilege, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/ 
background-state-secrets-privilege (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
 184. S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 10 (2008) (citing Press Release, Patrick Leahy, 
U.S. Senate, Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Secu-
rity While Preserving Accountability (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.leahy.senate 
.gov/press/examining-the-state-secrets-privilege-protecting-national-security 
-while-preserving-accountability). 
 185. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 
1109, 1117–25 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 186. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
§ 106(f), 92 Stat. 1783, 1794 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (1978)) (emphasis 
added). “In practice, the government always files such an affidavit, and it ap-
pears that no defendant has ever obtained a copy of the government’s state-
ment of probable cause or other documents that served as the basis for FISA 
surveillance.” PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 176.  
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Congress thought that a statutory procedure would better bal-
ance security and liberty interests than a common law rule de-
veloped by the courts.187 Notably, unlike Reynolds, FISA still 
permits judges to review the allegedly sensitive evidence, and it 
certainly does not suggest that the security-related evidence 
can serve as the basis for complete dismissal of a lawsuit.  
The state secrets doctrine has been expanding since FISA. 
If anything, however, that doctrine should be contracting in the 
post-FISA regime. FISC provides a confidential forum for adju-
dication, and FISA provides for in camera review of information 
if the Attorney General so requests. At the very least, the state 
secrets doctrine should not completely preclude litigants from 
bringing suits challenging the government’s acquisition of in-
formation through FISC-approved searches. In 1978, Congress 
attempted to establish a regime that would return separation of 
powers principles to the collection of intelligence. Reviewing 
certain information in camera still preserves separation of 
powers principles because a court is actually reviewing the in-
formation, verifying the Attorney General’s invocation of pro-
tecting foreign intelligence information. However, if courts 
permit the state secrets doctrine to completely prohibit law-
suits, there is no adequate check by the judiciary on the intelli-
gence community. This contravenes the lessons learned by the 
Church Committee and the delicate regime established by 
FISA.  
2. Confidential Constitutional and Statutory Interpretations  
As the state secrets doctrine has expanded, simultaneously 
has the scope of the orders issued by FISC. When originally en-
acted, FISC was supposed to be a court of limited jurisdiction, 
solely possessing the authority to issue investigative subpoenas 
before the government targeted an individual. Today, the FISA 
Court routinely engages in confidential constitutional and stat-
 
 187. The House report stated that FISA was intended to displace “uneven 
and inconclusive” case law developed by courts regarding electronic surveil-
lance and national security. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978). The re-
port continued:  
Moreover, the development of standards and restrictions by the judi-
ciary with respect to electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
purposes accomplished through case law threatens both civil liberties 
and the national security because that development occurs generally 
in ignorance of the facts, circumstances, and techniques of foreign in-
telligence electronic surveillance not present in the particular case be-
fore the court. 
Id.  
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utory interpretation. This shift not only departs from Con-
gress’s original intent in 1978 but also prevents parties from 
testing the government’s—and FISA Court’s—statutory and 
constitutional interpretation in a well-briefed, reasoned, and 
adversarial setting. Such adversarial challenges outside of 
FISC proceedings are particularly unlikely because parties of-
ten lack notice of surveillance (and therefore the ability to bring 
an as-applied challenge). More importantly, however, the vast 
majority of surveillance conducted under Sections 215 and 702 
will never find its way into any legal proceeding, criminal or 
civil, where the statutory or constitutional interpretation could 
potentially be uncovered and vetted.188 
Before the Snowden disclosures, the majority of FISC opin-
ions interpreting FISA and its relationship to the First and 
Fourth Amendments remained sealed, precluding individuals 
from learning about potential “injuries” to their civil liberties 
and bringing lawsuits in Article III courts that challenged the 
NSA or FBI’s investigation activities. As of 2007, FISC had on-
ly published one opinion since the court’s inception in 1978, 
prompting legislative attorneys to describe the publication pro-
cedure as “extremely rare.”189 Although publication of FISC 
opinions has been somewhat more common in the wake of the 
Snowden disclosures, there is still no way for the public to 
know if FISC is engaging in novel statutory or constitutional 
analysis.  
The FREEDOM Act tackled this impediment to effective 
review of the FISA Court and intelligence community. FISC 
opinions that “include[] a significant construction or interpreta-
tion of any provision of law,” including the term “specific selec-
tion term,” should be declassified “to the greatest extent practi-
cable.”190 Additionally, if a provision is exempted from 
declassification due to a “national security waiver,” the Attor-
 
 188. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 33–34. 
 189. BAZAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 5. 
 190. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 602(a), 129 Stat. 268, 281 (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a) (2012)). We note that the term “significant” may be 
ambiguous enough to open the door to unnecessary (and harmful) secrecy. 
Why not require FISC to publish each opinion that includes a novel applica-
tion of a statute? What is insignificant in the eyes of the Attorney General 
may be significant to the American citizen whose information may be imper-
missibly obtained under that interpretation. We hope the executive branch 
does not abuse this term, but notes its ambiguity, especially given the intelli-
gence community’s improper use of ambiguous terms in the past. 
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ney General must still provide the public with a summary of 
the legal interpretation.191  
Like other FISA reforms made by the FREEDOM Act, the 
declassification of opinions with “significant” constructions and 
interpretations of laws is an improvement. But, like other re-
forms, the declassification option seems like putting a Band-
Aid on a bullet hole. The issue was not just that FISC engaged 
in substantial statutory and constitutional interpretation with-
out disclosing its opinions to the public. Rather, the issue was 
the role FISC played in interpreting statutes and the 
Constitution. Under the original regime, FISC interpreted a 
narrow, unambiguous statute, and applied that language to 
specific facts provided by the government before authorizing a 
search. Now, FISC interprets broad and ambiguous language, 
applying that language to procedures employed after a search, 
and cannot question the factual base provided by the govern-
ment. The post-9/11 court is engaged in more of a legal and less 
of a factual inquiry. It is therefore less likely that the FISC of 
1978 would have needed to engage in the types of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation that is commonplace after the 
PATRIOT Act and FAA. Like bulk adjudication and collection, 
and executive impunity, excessive secrecy is a result of post-
9/11 changes made to FISA.  
We now turn to those broader, structural issues currently 
affecting FISC—issues that cannot be resolved with piecemeal 
legislation, but instead require reconceptualizing the role of the 
court and its relationship to the coordinate branches of gov-
ernment. 
III.  PROTECTING LIBERTIES BY ENSURING FISC ACTS 
LIKE A COURT—NOT AN EXECUTIVE ADJUNCT   
The FISA Court currently operates more closely to an ex-
ecutive adjunct than an Article III court. Rather than adjudi-
cating individual cases or controversies, the court approves sys-
tems and procedures developed by the executive branch. Rather 
than determining whether there is probable cause for a given 
search, the court approves programmatic surveillance based on 
a factual certification by the government. Even in regular Arti-
cle III proceedings that are subject to public scrutiny, courts 
are hesitant to question the executive branch’s assessment of 
 
 191. Id. § 602(c).  
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national security threats.192 But the FISA Court is even more 
likely to defer when it is engaging in bulk adjudication in a 
non-adversarial setting.193 The court is too many steps removed 
from the specific searches it approves on a macro scale and, 
therefore, less able to question the national security interests 
invoked by the executive branch.  
In this Part we lay out specific recommendations for re-
form. All recommendations are tied together by the need for 
ensuring civil liberties are protected and vetted through tradi-
tional Article III adjudication. If the executive branch chooses 
to utilize a confidential court, it must recognize that that court 
is still bound by the requirements of Article III of the Constitu-
tion. Section A begins by discussing the need for an “adversary” 
to the government in FISA Court proceedings. This is particu-
larly important in the post-9/11 adjudications that no longer 
resemble the ex parte “warrant” proceedings analogized to 
FISC adjudications in 1978. Next, Section B recommends that 
the FISA Court no longer approve targeting and minimization 
procedures under Section 702. In those proceedings, the court is 
approving procedures before they arguably give rise to a cog-
nizable injury, in effect issuing an advisory opinion prohibited 
by Article III of the Constitution. Finally, Section C discusses 
the need for greater transparency and opportunities for collat-
eral review. Although transparency must be balanced against 
the realistic need for protecting intelligence information, en-
shrouding foreign-intelligence related proceedings in secrecy 
undermines public trust in the institution and our government.  
A. RETURNING TO QUASI-ADVERSARIAL WARRANT PROCEEDINGS 
Courts serve a limited function within our government—
they must resolve cases and controversies involving real dis-
putes between parties of genuine interest. This requirement 
serves to ensure that parties to a proceeding both raise and 
vigorously examine all aspects of a given issue, which in turn 
improves judicial decision-making.194 The FISA Court’s current 
 
 192. See, e.g., Cent. Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178–79 
(1985).  
 193. See, e.g., Internet Metadata Opinion and Order, No. PR-TT [RE-
DACTED], slip. op. at 30–31 (FISA Ct. 2006), http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (“Such deference [to the executive 
branch] is particularly appropriate in this context, where the Court is not 
charged with making independent probable cause findings.”).  
 194. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., WORKSHOP REGARD-
ING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 215 OF THE 
  
2016] NO LONGER A NEUTRAL MAGISTRATE 2293 
 
practice of engaging in broad statutory and constitutional in-
terpretation without the benefit of an adversary to the govern-
ment does not satisfy the adversity requirement memorialized 
in the Constitution and Supreme Court jurisprudence.195 
During FISA’s enactment, a core concern was whether the 
FISA Court comported with Article III’s “case or controversy” 
requirement.196 Could the ex parte and in camera proceedings of 
the court satisfy the constitutional requirement of adversarial 
adjudication? The Department of Justice itself conceded in 
1978 that lack of adversity before the FISA Court presented a 
“difficult question.”197 The Justice Department justified FISA’s 
procedures by analogizing them to warrant proceedings, which 
are likewise conducted ex parte, involve a particular target, 
and require judicial approval prior to the search.198 Similar to 
warrant proceedings, the FISA Court would make individual-
ized assessments based on a variant of probable cause, and ap-
ply that standard to a specific warrant relating to a specific 
search (whether person or place) before the search occurred. 
Although FISC still engages in traditional warrant-like 
proceedings, many searches are approved via bulk adjudication. 
Whereas from 1978 to 2001, the FISA Court engaged exclusive-
ly in a quasi-adversarial warrant procedure, today the court is 
often even further removed from the discrete facts and argu-
ments that may justify ruling against the government.199 The 
court is less involved in the pre-search inquiry—it must accept 
the government’s certification of “relevance” to a “foreign intel-
 
USA PATRIOT ACT AND SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT 34 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORK-
SHOP] (statement of Honorable James Robertson, Retired, Dist. Court, Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court) (“[A]nybody who has been a judge will tell you 
that a judge needs to hear both sides of a case before deciding. It’s quite com-
mon, in fact it’s the norm to read one side’s brief or hear one side’s argument 
and think, hmm, that sounds right, until we read the other side.”). 
 195. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (articling the case or controversy provi-
sion); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (describing the adversity 
requirement and dismissing a suit in which the government effectively was 
both the plaintiff and defendant). 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 197. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 132, 
at 26 (statement of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel). 
 198. Id. at 29.  
 199. Until 2004, the FISA Court considered “government applications re-
lating to a specific person, a specific place, or a specific communication account 
or device.” PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 175 (emphasis 
added).  
  
2294 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2251 
 
ligence” purpose, and must do so without the government 
providing specific and articulable facts to support its certifica-
tion. The court plays a more expansive role in post-search pro-
cedure, by assessing targeting and minimization criteria. FISC 
thus is acting less like a neutral magistrate approving an indi-
vidualized warrant. 
These changes place judges in an uncomfortable position. 
FISC judges have less ability to rule against the government 
for factual reasons and are left to consider abstract collection 
and minimization procedures. Furthermore, judges are more 
likely to rule in favor of the government when national security 
is involved, leading the FISA Court to become more of a rubber 
stamp on behalf of government programs than a neutral check 
against executive overreach. This deference is memorialized in 
FISC opinions, one of which states, “[T]his Court has often rec-
ognized the expertise of the government in foreign intelligence 
collection and counterintelligence investigations of espionage 
and international terrorism, and accorded great weight to the 
government’s interpretation of FISA’s standards.”200 The lack of 
adversity leads to less developed arguments being provided to 
the FISA Court, and therefore the possibility of less well-
reasoned opinions, as borne out by the Second Circuit’s decision 
in ACLU v. Clapper. The risk of missing counterarguments to 
the government’s position—or failing to understand the depths 
of those counterarguments—is all the more pressing now that 
the FISA Court regularly engages in broad constitutional and 
statutory interpretation. Such risk undermines the integrity 
and impartiality of the court. 
One potential solution to this problem is to appoint an om-
budsman, or “Special Advocate,” to represent the public inter-
est before the FISA Court.201 This solution was recommended by 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), 
raised in Congress multiple times, and recently codified (to a 
limited extent) in the FREEDOM Act. FISA previously provid-
ed a mechanism for FISC judges to invite amici, or friends of 
the court, to comment on a case. However, the amici provision 
was rarely invoked, and never to provide an “assessment of the 
 
 200. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, Nos. Multiple (FISA Ct. May 17, 2002) (emphasis added), http://fas.org/ 
irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc051702.html. 
 201. Before the FREEDOM Act, FISA did “not provide a mechanism for the 
FISC to invite non-governmental parties to provide views on pending govern-
ment applications.” PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 180.  
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government’s legal authorization to conduct surveillance.”202 
The PCLOB recommended creating a “pool of ‘Special Advo-
cates’ who would be called upon to present independent views 
to the court in important cases.”203 The FREEDOM Act adopted 
a variation of the PCLOB’s recommendation.204 Now, FISC 
judges may appoint pre-approved “amici” to present arguments 
on a FISA application that, “in the opinion of the court, pre-
sents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, unless the 
court issues a finding that such appointment is not appropri-
ate.”205 Like other aspects of the FREEDOM Act, this amici 
provision is a step in the right direction but does not remedy all 
of FISA’s post-9/11 underlying structural wrongs.  
There are a few issues with the FREEDOM Act’s amici 
provision. First, an amicus does not need to present a view that 
is “adversarial” to the government. Rather, the amicus provides 
“(A) legal arguments that advance the protection of individual 
privacy and civil liberties; (B) information related to intelli-
gence collection or communications technology; or (C) legal ar-
guments or information regarding any other area relevant to 
the issue presented to the court.”206 These interests may well be 
quasi-adversarial to the government, but there may also be sit-
 
 202. Id. at 181; see also id. (describing the amicus procedure before the 
FISA Court of Review).  
 203. Id. at 184. Important cases are those involving programmatic surveil-
lance and bulk collection of data, as distinguished from the more individual-
ized proceedings that resemble traditional warrant proceedings. Id. at 183–84. 
The PCLOB recommended that the “Special Advocate” only present argu-
ments when invited and that the advocate need not always serve as an “adver-
sary” to the government. Rather, the advocate would read the government’s 
position and could agree with it. We think this distinction is not only risky, 
but it also misses the mark. As noted by Judge Robertson, the judicial deci-
sion-making process is improved when adversarial positions are presented. 
See TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194. The requirement of ad-
versity is enforced in other Article III courts. For example, when the Obama 
administration declined to argue on behalf of the Defense of Marriage Act, the 
Supreme Court and Solicitor General recognized that Congress needed its own 
representation. See Editorial, Defense of Marriage Act: Attack the Law, Not the 
Lawyer, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/21/ 
opinion/la-ed-doma-20110421. One side, even the somewhat neutral position of 
the “government,” would not suffice. Id. (“[W]ith sharp-witted counsel on both 
sides making the strongest possible arguments, it is more likely that justice 
will be done. For another, a lawyer who defends an individual or a law, no 
matter how unpopular or distasteful, helps ensure that the outcome is viewed 
as fair.”).  
 204. See FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 279 (cod-
ified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g) (2012)). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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uations where they are not. Second, an the amicus lacks the 
usual authority and rights of an adverse party. The amicus, as 
a mere “friend” of the court as opposed to a party to the action, 
cannot appeal any “losing” decisions to the FISA Court of Re-
view and Supreme Court, like an adverse party could in any 
other individual lawsuit. The amici provision thus provides on-
ly a surface level adversity to FISC proceedings, but does not 
change the underlying structural issues that limit FISC’s abil-
ity to provide meaningful oversight.207  
Finally, the amici provision contains hallmark ambiguous 
language, which the government and judges may invoke to 
avoid appointing an amicus in a given case. What constitutes a 
“significant” interpretation of law? If significance is measured 
by the potential number of United States persons impacted by 
a practice, then an amicus should be appointed in every case 
regarding programmatic surveillance. Also, does “novel” mean 
from the time of the FREEDOM Act onward, when the FISA 
Court could theoretically invoke and benefit from a quasi-
adversarial amicus? Or, because opinions issued before the en-
actment of the FREEDOM Act are binding precedent, are those 
issues settled (even though they were decided without the bene-
fit of quasi-adversarial briefing)? Moreover, the FREEDOM Act 
contains an escape clause for the court—FISC does not need to 
appoint an amicus, even if the case involves novel or significant 
issues, if “such appointment is not appropriate.”208 What would 
render such appointment inappropriate? Congress provided ab-
solutely no guidance, and this is exactly the kind of ambiguous 
language that can be used to further the intelligence communi-
ty’s preference for operating in a cloak of secrecy at the expense 
of personal liberties. Indeed, there is already evidence that 
members of the FISA Court who are hostile to the FREEDOM 
 
 207. See TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194 (statement of 
Honorable James Robertson, Retired, Dist. Court, Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court (“[T]his process needs an adversary[,] . . . an institutional ad-
versary to challenge and take the other side of anything that is presented to 
the FISA Court.”)); cf. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 46 (arguing that 
prior proposals of public ombudsmen provided adversity in name only but 
would not change the substance of FISC proceedings).  
 208. FREEDOM Act § 401. The public advocate proposal has received a lot 
of attention. But not all proposals are equal. To be effective, there must be “a 
more empowered public advocate—one who is authorized to appear even with-
out invitation from the government or the court, and, still more importantly, 
who is entitled to full access of information relevant to her duties.” Schlanger, 
supra note 5. 
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Act’s amici provision will use the Act’s ambiguity to preclude 
the appointment of an amicus.209 
Given the weaknesses remaining after the FREEDOM Act, 
we would propose that Congress go further. So long as FISC 
proceedings no longer resemble traditional warrant proceedings 
in which the court is approving a search of a particular person, 
place, or thing, there must be truly adverse positions presented 
to the court. As mentioned before, the current proceedings like-
ly do not satisfy Article III of the Constitution. In 1978, a sig-
nificant reason Congress moved forward with FISA—despite 
concerns regarding compliance with Article III—was that the 
FISA proceedings were limited in nature and greatly resembled 
traditional warrant proceedings.210 It was that similarity to 
warrant proceedings that justified the creation of a completely 
ex parte court. That fundamental premise no longer holds now 
that the court also engages in bulk adjudication of program-
matic surveillance, which does not resemble the individualized 
determinations made by a judge issuing a warrant. In those 
proceedings, there must be an individual who presents coun-
terarguments to the government. Those counterarguments 
should not be statutorily limited, as they currently are under 
the FREEDOM Act. And there should be no exceptions to the 
invocation of an adverse party representative.  
We would also recommend an expansion of responsibilities, 
such that an amicus is more akin to an “ombudsman.” 
Ombudsmen, or “official[s] appointed to receive, investigate, 
and report on private citizens’ complaints about the govern-
ment,”211 have been utilized in the Nordic countries for centu-
ries to ensure that executive agencies comply with statutes and 
 
 209. See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for Orders 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, Nos. 15-77, 15-78, slip op. at 3–6 
(FISA Ct. June 17, 2015), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
BR%2015-77%2015-78%20Memorandum%20Opinion.pdf (suggesting that it 
may be unnecessary to appoint an amicus if “the court concludes . . . the legal 
question is relatively simple or is capable of only a single reasonable or ration-
al outcome,” or if the appointment would result in “some degree of additional 
expense and delay”); see also Elizabeth Goitein, The FISC’s Newest Opinion: 
Proof of the Need for an Amicus, JUST SECURITY (June 23, 2015, 9:43 AM), 
http://www.justsecurity.org/24134/fiscs-newest-opinion-proof-amicus (describ-
ing weaknesses in Judge Saylor’s analysis). 
 210. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.  
 211. Ombudsman, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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fulfill their public obligations.212 This change in function has the 
potential to bring adversity to the court without undermining 
the legitimate needs of government to conduct confidential na-
tional security surveillance. The ombudsman would not have a 
limited role, raise only certain statutorily defined arguments, 
or serve at the discretion of FISC. Rather, the ombudsman 
would be generally charged with representing the public inter-
ests and ensuring that the government pursues surveillance 
more broadly in accordance with the Constitution and statutes 
of the United States. For example, we believe the ombudsman 
should be able to challenge the government’s certification of 
“relevance” to a “foreign intelligence investigation.” 
A (preferable) alternative to appointing an ombudsman in 
cases involving bulk collection and programmatic surveillance, 
however, would be limiting the role of FISC, so that it only ad-
judicates individualized warrant applications, similar to pre-
9/11 practices.  
B. LIMITING FISC TO ADJUDICATING INDIVIDUAL CASES AND  
CONTROVERSIES  
The approval of programmatic, as opposed to individual-
ized, surveillance also raises questions regarding FISC’s com-
pliance with Article III’s requirement that courts decide indi-
vidual and real—not abstract—disputes. A fundamental 
premise of separation of powers principles is that courts resolve 
concrete cases, as opposed to merely issuing advisory opinions. 
The prohibition against Article III courts issuing advisory opin-
ions has its foundation in “the earliest days of the Republic.”213 
In short, federal courts cannot “decide abstract, hypothetical or 
contingent questions.”214 FISA Court bulk adjudication of pro-
grammatic surveillance arguably constitutes an advisory opin-
ion in two distinct ways—the court’s decisions are reviewed 
 
 212. See The Parliamentary Ombudsman, SIVILOMBUDSMANNEN, http:// 
www.sivilombudsmannen.no/?lang=en_GB (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (de-
scribing the role of the Norwegian Parliamentary Ombudsman). 
 213. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legisla-
tures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998). 
 214. Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); see 
also Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of 
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 644–45 (1992) (collecting Supreme Court 
characterizations of advisory opinions); Krotoszynski, supra note 213, at 17 
(“This prohibition generally has been read to preclude federal courts, as a mat-
ter of basic Article III jurisprudence, from offering up advice on legal questions 
in the absence of a lawsuit brought by litigants with standing to maintain the 
action.”). 
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post-judgment by the executive branch and the issues present-
ed to the court are not yet ripe for review.215  
We begin with ripeness, or the lack of a justiciable contro-
versy. Under Section 702, “the [FISA] court has no role in ap-
proving individual intrusions at all. Rather, its substantive role 
is limited to determining whether generic sets of targeting and 
minimization procedures comply with the statute . . . and with 
the Fourth Amendment.”216 In essence, the court is ruling on 
the appropriateness of guidelines before they have been admin-
istered and applied to a particular person or search.217 Even 
more problematic, the review is brought forward by the gov-
ernment itself—the party that develops the guidelines. The 
FISA Court acts more akin to an administrative adjunct, posit-
ing on the validity of various agency regulations before they ac-
tually go into effect. That is not a traditional Article III role 
and is of dubious constitutionality so long as FISC is labeled as 
a court over which Article III judges preside. 
Second, there is the issue of post-judgment review by exec-
utive agencies. Even after the FISA Court issues its opinions on 
programmatic surveillance, the executive branch has a signifi-
cant amount of flexibility to amend its procedures and search-
es. For example, after the FISA Court held that essentially all 
metadata is relevant to investigating terrorism under Section 
215, the government had a blank check and could decide for it-
self how to sift through the collected data for potentially rele-
vant information. Under Section 702, FISC merely approves 
generic targeting and minimization procedures, which contain 
enough flexibility that the government may then apply them in 
a variety of ways to specific searches and collected information. 
By approving programmatic surveillance, one step removed 
from potential infringements on individuals’ rights, the court is 
not deciding an actual controversy—there has not even been a 
search or alleged violation of a statutory right.  
We believe FISC should no longer engage in the approval 
of programmatic surveillance through bulk adjudication, which 
is an unanticipated evolution of FISA, following the enactment 
 
 215. Lee, supra note 214, at 645–52.  
 216. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 27. 
 217. Courts do engage in post-enactment review of rules issued by agencies 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. That review is different from FISC’s, 
however, because an adversarial record is developed through notice and com-
ment rulemaking, and Congress has chosen to create a cause of action for in-
dividuals. Finally, it is not the government that brings the action, but instead 
an individual aggrieved by the agency rules.  
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of the PATRIOT Act and FAA. Doing so not only contradicts the 
original intent of Congress in 1978 but also likely violates Arti-
cle III of the Constitution. As discussed in Part II.B, FISC was 
supposed to be a court of limited jurisdiction, engaging in war-
rant-like adjudications. That is still an appropriate role for 
FISC, but only if the court is approving individual warrant ap-
plicants ex ante and individuals subject to surveillance are noti-
fied and able to challenge the surveillance ex post. However, 
FISC additionally approves broad searches—including one 
search authorized by a single court order issued under the FAA 
that permitted the targeting of 89,138 individuals, groups, and 
organizations.218 The government cannot credibly argue that 
such a broad search is related to the individualized and specific 
facts that are the hallmark of Article III adjudications, espe-
cially when the search is premised on a factual certification by 
the government. By approving such broad searches, FISC lends 
legitimacy (and insulation) to programmatic surveillance, but 
not in a meaningful way that actually limits executive authori-
ty.  
Even more problematic, however, FISC has become an ad-
junct to intelligence agencies, providing advisory opinions on 
the procedures that the agencies put in place. Those sorts of de-
cisions should not be made by an Article III court, period.219 
And they certainly should not be made by an Article III court 
that can make broad constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tions contrary to the holdings of other, transparent and tradi-
tional, Article III courts.220 Rather, the targeting and minimiza-
tion procedures should be promulgated by an executive agency, 
and only considered by an Article III court if there is a cogniza-
ble injury to a party as a direct result of the application of those 
procedures. Pre-enforcement review of rules and regulations is 
limited within the confines of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.221 The FISA Court should not regularly engage in such re-
 
 218. See Barton Gellman et al., The NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Tar-
geted Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted 
-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/ 
8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html. 
 219. See TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194, at 36 (statement 
of Honorable James Robertson, Dist. Court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court) (“[T]hat’s not the bailiwick of judges. Judges don’t make policy. They 
review policy determinations for compliance with statutory law but they do so 
in the context once again of adversary process.”).  
 220. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
 221. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2015) (limiting judicial review to “final agency ac-
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view, especially when it is only the government that presents 
the “issue” (i.e., proposed procedures) to the court, as opposed 
to an aggrieved party with a cognizable injury.  
It may be argued that FISC’s role approving programmatic 
surveillance is a necessary evil given the evolving nature of 
technology, the vast amount of information government agen-
cies need to sift through in national security investigations, and 
the interconnectedness of society.222 Certainly we agree that 
there is more information available and that the lines between 
domestic and international communications are blurry. Howev-
er, this is all the more reason that the procedures under which 
the government collects and retains information should be sub-
ject to public scrutiny, and only addressed by a court if there is 
a concrete and ripe dispute.223 Public debate of targeting and 
minimization procedures need not threaten national security. 
They are general procedures (which could be redacted as neces-
sary) that apply regardless of who/what is being searched.  
By approving generalized procedures rather than individu-
alized warrants, the FISA Court is no longer acting like an Ar-
ticle III court charged with making individual and concrete de-
cisions (and is no longer acting consistently with its original 
1978 design). FISC instead operates more like an Article II ad-
junct to the executive branch, issuing advisory opinions on pro-
cedures before they are applied to a specific individual and set 
of facts. The court is already in a difficult position, lacking the 
benefit of an adversarial presentation of issues. It is even less 
likely to question the government when it is engaging in prem-
ature judicial review, without the benefit of an actual injury to 
serve as the basis for limiting government action.  
C. EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLATERAL CHALLENGE  
AND REVIEW  
The constitutional requirements described in Sections A 
and B serve to protect more than the rights of individual liti-
gants—they also ensure that all relevant arguments are made, 
 
tion[s] for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”). 
 222. Increased globalization does pose a problem. The distinction between 
foreign and domestic communications is becoming increasingly blurry. Howev-
er, this is all the more reason that procedures for searches pursuant to Section 
702 should be publicly discussed and debated, giving members of society warn-
ing about the scope of their communications that may fall within the purview 
of a Section 702 search.  
 223. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (discussing the im-
portance of the procedural requirements of approving searches).  
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enabling the FISA Court to make more informed and impartial 
decisions, and citizens to actively and accurately participate in 
our constitutional democracy. The statutes and orders FISC 
has been enforcing “require[] actual policy analysis: weighing 
the security gains against liberty costs. Ideally, that weighing 
should occur in public.”224 The impact public discourse can have 
on society and the judiciary is evidenced by the nation’s re-
sponse to the Snowden disclosures.225 Public pressure following 
the Snowden disclosures—including via Freedom of Infor-
mation Act lawsuits—led to the declassification of FISC opin-
ions and the eventual enactment of the FREEDOM Act. Even 
so, almost all FISA Court opinions remain classified. Although 
troubling in individual cases, this is particularly troubling 
when a court is making more binding statutory and constitu-
tional interpretations than in the past. 
First, as recognized by the FREEDOM Act, FISC should 
not issue confidential statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tions. Its only original purpose was to authorize individual 
subpoenas in the most sensitive cases involving national secu-
rity—not to create binding, but confidential, legal precedent. 
FISC’s statutory and constitutional interpretations are even 
more questionable when a traditional Article III court reaches 
a publicized contrary conclusion. Circuit splits in our federal 
court system are inevitable, but usually the two courts inter-
preting the statute or constitutional provision stand on equal 
footing in the eyes of Article III—the decision is made after a 
particular case or controversy is adjudicated in an adversarial 
setting. FISC, however, is not bound by any court other than 
the FISA Court of Review and the Supreme Court. Therefore, 
only months after the Second Circuit issued its thorough and 
 
 224. Schlanger, supra note 5 (emphasis added). Public scrutiny is particu-
larly important because leaving regulation to “insiders” risks “impotence” and 
“capture.” Id.  
 225. Similar public discourse, particularly in the wake of Watergate, led to 
the formation of the Church Committee and the eventual enactment of FISA.  
During the last eight years, beginning with Ramparts magazine’s ex-
posure of CIA covert relationships with non-governmental organiza-
tions, there has been a series of allegations in the press and Congress 
which have provoked serious questions about the conduct of intelli-
gence agencies at home and abroad. The Watergate disclosures raised 
additional questions concerning abuse of power by the executive 
branch, misuse of intelligence agencies, and the need to strengthen 
legal restraints against such abuses. 
CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 10; see SCHWARZ, supra note 
167, at 175–76 (providing a thorough description of the Church Committee’s 
origins). 
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well-reasoned opinion in ACLU v. Clapper, holding that the 
NSA’s bulk collection program violated Section 215 (and likely 
the Fourth Amendment), the FISA Court disregarded the Se-
cond Circuit’s opinion and upheld the program.226 FISC reached 
its contrary conclusion after a process significantly less adver-
sarial than that before the Second Circuit, undermining the 
public credibility of FISC’s legal analysis. Thus, the “split” is 
not as justifiable as a traditional circuit split—especially given 
that the Second Circuit is a court of general jurisdiction, broad-
ly tasked with interpreting law, whereas FISC is a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction, tasked with authorizing a limited subset of 
searches. 
Even assuming that the FISA Court can create binding 
statutory and constitutional analysis, those interpretations 
must be made public. There is no doubt that “secrecy plays an 
essential role in delicate intelligence work . . . [but] it cannot 
justify submerging in shadow entire programs, sweeping policy 
changes, important shifts in law, or acts that subvert the ideals 
of America.”227 Such a justification is particularly lacking with 
regard to FISC, which was established to prevent disclosure of 
individual national security investigations and threats—very 
different from the broad and open-ended statutory interpreta-
tions of Sections 702 and 215, divorced from a specific search, 
in which the FISA Court currently engages. Although the 
FREEDOM Act does put procedures in place for declassification 
of certain opinions, there remain significant potential loopholes 
and ways for the government to evade disclosure. 
A second related recommended reform is that there must 
be more opportunity for collateral review of the government’s 
interpretation of national security laws. Society is demanding 
greater “transparency and accountability” mechanisms to en-
sure the government, with FISC’s approval, does not subvert 
privacy to nominal security interests.228 The publishing of re-
dacted FISC opinions serves this goal because it may provide a 
basis for litigant standing to challenge a given collection prac-
 
 226. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Re-
quiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, slip op. at 9–15 (FISA Ct. 
June 29, 2015) (“Second Circuit rulings are not binding on the FISC, and this 
Court respectfully disagrees with that Court’s analysis . . . .”). 
 227. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 46. 
 228. See Letter from Advocacy for Principled Action in Gov’t et al., to Pres-
ident Barack Obama et al. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.openthegovernment 
.org/sites/default/files/NSA_coalition_letter_032515.pdf (putting forth recom-
mendations for legislation reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act). 
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tice. But traditional Article III courts can also further this goal 
by inquiring into the basis of the government’s invocation of the 
state secrets privilege. Senator Leahy has introduced multiple 
bills with bipartisan support that would codify the state secrets 
privilege and courts’ obligation to actually review the allegedly 
secret evidence.229 Those proposed bills do not undermine the 
government’s ability to assert the privilege and keep national 
security-related documents classified. “Rather, the bill[s] would 
allow judges to look at the actual evidence the Government 
submits so that they, neutral judges, rather than self-
interested executive branch officials, would render the ultimate 
decision whether the State secrets privilege should apply.”230 
Similarly, courts should not permit the government to com-
pletely dismiss suits that challenge the constitutionality of for-
eign surveillance under the state secrets doctrine. There is no 
reason that applying an evidentiary privilege should “permit 
the removal of entire allegations resulting in out-and-out dis-
missal of the entire suit”231—especially when courts have exper-
tise reviewing classified information and FISC has procedures 
in place for in camera review of government submissions in ad-
versarial FISC proceedings.232 By blindly accepting the govern-
ment’s invocation of the state secrets privilege, courts abdicate 
their responsibility under Marbury to ensure that coordinate 
branches of government act in accordance with the Constitu-
tion.233  
Both the publishing of redacted opinions and expanding of 
avenues for third party litigant challenges to FISC’s statutory 
and constitutional interpretations reflect the same underlying 
value—there must be a certain amount of transparency and ac-
countability in the operation of the intelligence community. 
This is important not only to reduce the current culture of im-
punity but also because “it is critical to the integrity of the pro-
cess that the public have confidence in its impartiality and ri-
gor.”234 Currently, there remains in our society “fundamental 
 
 229. See S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008).  
 230. 155 CONG. REC. 3553, 3620 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy 
introducing S. 417). 
 231. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 232. FISC R.P. 7. 
 233. Even the Reynolds court recognized that “[j]udicial control over the 
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.” 
Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953). 
 234. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 182. 
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distrust” of the intelligence agencies and systems put into place 
by FISA.235 Some secrets must be protected in the name of na-
tional security.236 But we must not permit a system in which 
the government can claim privilege without a coordinate 
branch of government confirming the validity of the invocation 
of that privilege. The Church Committee recommended that the 
“burden of proof should be on those who ask that a secret pro-
gram or policy be kept secret.”237 That recommendation rings 
true today. The default must be transparency.  
IV.  PREVENTING A RELAPSE DURING THE NEXT 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY   
Our “democratic system” must “effectively govern[] in the 
crucial area of secret intelligence.”238 Recently, Snowden’s dis-
closures put pressure on the United States government to es-
tablish systems within the intelligence community that limit 
the power of intelligence agencies—not necessarily the power to 
conduct intelligence operations, but the power to conduct such 
operations at the cost of civil liberties. Congress responded to 
those pressures with the FREEDOM Act, which is an admira-
ble step in the right direction. But given the continuous use of 
ambiguous statutory language and the lack of sufficient con-
gressional oversight, the risk remains that “mission creep” will 
once again erode civil liberties as the nature of our enemies and 
foreign powers shift.  
The Church Committee found that the subtle erosion of 
personal liberties occurred because Congress failed to issue 
clear laws and provide adequate oversight, and the courts thus 
could more easily avoid making clear rulings on the relation-
ship between the executive and legislative branches when it 
came to national security.239 In sum, the Committee found that 
 
 235. Id. at 15. 
 236. For example, the Church Committee suggested that “details about 
military activities, technology, sources of information and particular intelli-
gence methods are secrets that should be carefully protected.” CHURCH COMM. 
REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 12–13. But the executive should not be able 
to shield embarrassing or controversial programs under the guise of security.  
 237. Id. at 8.  
 238. Id. at 15.  
 239. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 185 (“The 
standards governing the use of these [surveillance] techniques have been im-
precise and susceptible to expansive interpretation and in the absence of any 
judicial check on the application of these vague standards to particular cases, 
it was relatively easy for intelligence agencies and their superiors to extend 
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“intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional 
rights of citizens and that they have done so primarily because 
checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitu-
tion to assure accountability have not been applied.”240 This 
fundamental lesson of constitutional law has once again been 
ignored in the wake of 9/11. The systems of checks and balanc-
es recommended by the Church Committee must be modified 
given the growth of the intelligence community, technological 
advances, and increased globalization.241 
We use this final Part to return to the first principles of the 
Church Committee and bring foundational principles of separa-
tion of powers back to the discourse regarding security and in-
dividual liberties. We must reestablish a permanent system of 
external checks—via congressional committees, public disclo-
sures (of general principles and systems, not specific infor-
mation that could undermine intelligence operations), and tra-
ditional Article III review, informed by statutes with cogent 
and limiting language. Without “[c]lear legal standards and ef-
fective oversight,” the abuses which led to the formation of the 
Church Committee and the Snowden disclosures may once 
again creep into intelligence practices, and “domestic intelli-
gence activity . . . [will] undermine the democratic nation it is 
intended to protect.”242 
There must be robust congressional oversight, and that 
oversight must be embraced, not eschewed, by the intelligence 
community. The Church Committee found that intelligence 
overreach occurred in part because “Congress ha[d] not effec-
tively fulfilled its constitutional role [as a check on the 
executive branch] in the area of domestic intelligence.”243 The 
Committee noted that although the “problem of how Congress 
can effectively use secret knowledge in its legislative process 
remains to be resolved . . . a strong and effective oversight 
committee is an essential first step” to addressing that chal-
lenge.244 We need “empowered [] insiders who are attuned to 
 
the[] [surveillance techniques] to many cases where they were clearly inap-
propriate.”). 
 240. Id. at 289. 
 241. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STRENGTHENING INTELLIGENCE OVER-
SIGHT 5–8 (Michael German ed., 2015) [hereinafter INTELLIGENCE OVER-
SIGHT]. 
 242. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 20. 
 243. Id. at 280. 
 244. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added). 
For example, only a “few members” of Congress knew of the “secret charter for 
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civil liberties” because otherwise, when making intelligence de-
cisions, civil liberties “receive[] not just less attention, but no 
consideration at all.”245 Moreover, given the inevitable need to 
classify some practices related to national security intelligence, 
it falls on Congress to ensure “that the authorities as they are 
publicly presented are consistent with the manner in which 
they are being exercised.”246 
Oversight today is undermined not only by structural 
changes—such as a larger intelligence community and techno-
logical advances—but also by institutional changes, particular-
ly excessive congressional secrecy. For example, Congress was 
not “adequately informed about the NSA’s post-9/11 collection 
activities” in the Terrorist Surveillance Program because “the 
Bush administration limited notifications regarding the NSA 
program to . . . the chairs and ranking members of each intelli-
gence committee.”247 There may be some instances where, due 
to extraordinary circumstances regarding a covert action, lim-
ited notification may be appropriate. But “intelligence collec-
tion programs,” such as those exposed by Edward Snowden, do 
not fall within that narrow category.248 
Congressional oversight does not mean the executive 
branch will be constantly at odds with congressional commit-
tees. Instead, congressional oversight provides both an im-
portant check on executive authority by ensuring the executive 
branch is not misleading Congress and the public, and provides 
public legitimacy to “secret” operations.249 Take, for example, 
the recent experience of Senator Diane Feinstein, Chair of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, and the release of the torture 
 
intelligence activities,” and those that did had no means of discussing that in-
formation with other members of Congress. Id.  
 245. Schlanger, supra note 5. 
 246. See Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 159. 
 247. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT, supra note 241, at 10. 
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report. Feinstein is one of the “bigge[st] booster[s] of the C.I.A.,” 
but she also requires honesty and transparency from intelli-
gence agencies.250 As she has said, “Oversight can’t just be going 
to a hearing and listening to what somebody says, when you 
don’t know whether they’re telling you the truth or not.”251 She 
was challenged by both the CIA and the White House when she 
began investigating allegations of torture and, even more so, 
when she decided to make some such information public. She 
was told that releasing the torture report would incite violence 
around the globe. But, despite the executive branch’s dire pre-
dictions, the skies did not fall. Instead, both the executive 
branch and society were assured that the intelligence commit-
tee provided actual oversight.  
Oversight goes hand-in-hand with providing clear statuto-
ry directives. Feinstein’s primary recommendation to President 
Obama after the issuance of the report was closing legal “loop-
holes” that made the torture possible.252 Such loopholes, often 
provided by fuzzy language, also exist in FISA, as amended by 
the PATRIOT Act, FAA, and FREEDOM Act. Take, for exam-
ple, the use of the term “foreign intelligence” in Section 702—
one of the terms identified by the Church Committee as provid-
ing “ambiguous” and “fuzzy instructions.”253 In 1978, FISA lim-
ited search authority to “foreign powers” and their “agents,” not 
only narrowly defined terms but also terms that functionally 
served the needs of the intelligence community. The FAA, how-
ever, brought with it the return of the ambiguous term “foreign 
intelligence.” Moreover, the FISA Court cannot question the 
executive branch’s “foreign intelligence” determination, leaving 
the meaning of that term completely within the executive 
branch’s discretion.254 The use of such broad language is not 
good for a variety of reasons. First, it provides fodder to agen-
cies that are prone to mission creep and prioritizing “security” 
over personal liberties.255 Second, and perhaps more important-
 
 250. Connie Bruck, The Inside War, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), http:// 
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ly, it provides minimal guidance to the FISA Court, which is al-
ready in a difficult position, serving as the only “adverse” party, 
or check, on the government’s use of intelligence for security 
purposes.  
The FAA provides a prime example of the interconnection 
between congressional oversight and clear statutory directives 
for an additional reason. At the time the FAA was enacted, 
Congress had limited information about the Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program and, thus, the scope of programmatic surveil-
lance.256 So when Congress was “updating” FISA at the execu-
tive branch’s request, it lacked complete information on the 
scope of programs to which it was giving statutory credence.257 
Therefore, most members of Congress did not “contemplate[] 
[the] broad, programmatic collection” Section 702 purportedly 
authorized.258 If Congress had been operating with full 
knowledge of the scope of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, it 
is very likely it would have chosen different language when 
structuring Section 702, guaranteeing greater civil liberty pro-
tection to United States persons. And the lack of more artful 
draftsmanship by Congress opened the door for FISC to broadly 
interpret the statute in the government’s favor via its tradi-
tional deference to the executive branch on issues of national 
security.259  
Constitutional structural protections—such as robust con-
gressional oversight and a comprehensive (and clear) statutory 
framework—are even more essential given the evolution of both 
technology and increased globalization. From 1978 to the pre-
sent, as technology evolved, the intelligence community mini-
mized the scope of those evolutions, attempting to acquire more 
 
views have received all too little respect [in the intelligence community], un-
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information through outdated modes of statutory and constitu-
tional analysis. One Bush official recently stated that it was in-
accurate to call the Terrorist Surveillance Program’s collection 
of metadata “surveillance,” because surveillance requires the 
acquisition of “content.”260 That may have been a convenient po-
sition for someone in the Department of Justice’s Office of Le-
gal Counsel, but it is contrary to public opinion and Article III 
court opinions issued through traditional, public, adversarial 
adjudication.261 The next technological frontier is the scope of 
encrypted information the government should be able to access 
with a FISC order.262 If the decisions are made behind closed 
doors, history has shown that the intelligence community is 
likely to broadly construe its searching authority and minimize 
technological incursions on privacy, unless some external au-
thority questions the agency’s application of former laws to new 
technology.263 
In short, we are more likely to find the appropriate balance 
between security and liberty if intelligence agencies operate 
within the usual confines of the Constitution. No one—and no 
entity—is above the law. This fundamental premise of our con-
stitutional democracy does not undermine our national securi-
ty—it enhances it. Clear laws guiding intelligence agencies and 
courts interpreting the actions of those agencies will clarify the 
roles of both the executive and judicial branch. And strong con-
gressional oversight will also serve to limit executive overreach. 
Each coequal branch must play its role, utilizing its unique 
competencies, if we are to find the right balance between secu-
rity and liberty.  
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  CONCLUSION   
In the wake of 9/11, our country, for the second time in half 
a century, lost sight of the fact “that to ignore the dangers 
posed by secret government action is to invite the further 
weakening of our democracy.”264 A sense of urgency, similar to 
that catalyzed by the Church Committee’s findings, returned in 
the wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures. Once again, “se-
crets” were unveiled, and the nation—and world—lost faith in 
our nation’s ability to protect itself without invading individual 
liberties. Through the FREEDOM Act, Congress attempted to 
repair some of that lost faith. However, as we have shown, the 
FREEDOM Act does not remedy the structural and procedural 
wrongs currently plaguing the FISA Court and that court’s re-
lationship to coordinate branches of government. 
The FISA Court no longer fulfills its intended limited role 
in adjudicating sensitive matters of national security. When the 
executive branch seeks a warrant to search a specific target or 
place, it is akin to a traditional warrant application and under-
standable that such a proceeding would need to be ex parte and 
confidential.265 However, when the executive branch comes to a 
confidential court, asking it to approve procedures divorced 
from a specific search or controversy, asking it to approve the 
collection of myriad communications that may implicate United 
States persons, the executive branch is asking the court to ex-
ceed its original design and, more importantly, its constitution-
al role. To the extent the government needs approval of surveil-
lance procedures and bulk collection unrelated to a specific 
investigative subpoena, those requests must be made through 
traditional mechanisms—whether administrative (via regula-
tions) or judicial (via judicial review in traditional Article III 
courts). It cannot be that the only way to effectively further na-
tional security interests is to create a court that violates Article 
III of the Constitution.  
There is undoubtedly an “inherent conflict between the 
government’s perceived need to conduct surveillance and the 
citizens’ constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dis-
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sent.”266 However, history has also taught us that the erosion of 
liberties for the sake of security is a risky prospect, and one 
that does more harm than good for our nation over the long 
run.267 This is especially true given the “tragic conceit” of secre-
cy—“[i]nevitably, the truth prevails and policies pursued on the 
premise that they could be plausibly denied, in the end damage 
America’s reputation and the faith of her people in their gov-
ernment.”268 As recognized by the Church Committee’s domestic 
task force: “Knowledge is the key to control. Secrecy should no 
longer be allowed to shield the existence of the constitutional, 
legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of government or 
from the American people themselves.”269 It would be better for 
personal liberties, and the development of statutory and consti-
tutional law, if FISC operated less as a shield to broad secret 
intelligence policies, and more like an Article III court.  
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